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Abstract 
 
There is currently a broad effort underway in the United States and internationally 
by several organizations to craft regulations enabling the safe operation of UAVs in the 
NAS.  Current federal regulations governing unmanned aircraft are limited in scope, and 
the lack of regulations is a barrier to achieving the full potential benefit of UAV 
operations.  To inform future FAA regulations, an investigation of the safety 
considerations for UAV operation in the NAS was performed.  Key issues relevant to 
operations in the NAS, including performance and operating architecture were examined, 
as well as current rules and regulations governing unmanned aircraft.  In integrating UAV 
operations in the NAS, it will be important to consider the implications of different levels 
of vehicle control and autonomous capability and the source of traffic surveillance in the 
system. 
A system safety analysis was performed according to FAA system safety 
guidelines for two critical hazards in UAV operation: midair collision and ground impact.  
Event-based models were developed describing the likelihood of ground fatalities and 
midair collisions under several assumptions.  From the models, a risk analysis was 
performed calculating the expected level of safety for each hazard without mitigation.  
The variation of expected level of safety was determined based on vehicle characteristics 
and population density for the ground impact hazard, and traffic density for midair 
collisions. 
The results of the safety analysis indicate that it may be possible to operate small 
UAVs with few operational and size restrictions over the majority of the United States.  
As UAV mass increases, mitigation measures must be utilized to further reduce both 
ground impact and midair collision risks to target levels from FAA guidance.  It is in the 
public interest to achieve the full benefits of UAV operations, while still preserving 
safety through effective mitigation of risks with the least possible restrictions.  Therefore, 
a framework was presented under which several potential mitigation measures were 
introduced and could be evaluated.  It is likely that UAVs will be significant users of the 
future NAS, and this report provides an analytical basis for evaluating future regulatory 
decisions. 
This document is based on the thesis of Roland E. Weibel submitted to the Department of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Aeronautics and 
Astronautics. 
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 Chapter 1 
1 Introduction 
Introduction 
1.1 Objective 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, or UAVs, are emerging as a new type of aircraft to be 
operated in the National Airspace System (NAS).  Recent technological advancements 
and increased military utilization have proven the operational viability of UAVs and 
made them attractive for a wide range of potential civil and commercial applications in 
the United States.  Federal aviation regulations did not anticipate the operation of 
unmanned aircraft, and the lack of regulations is an impediment to achieving the full 
potential public benefit that UAVs may offer.  The Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) has identified the need to develop policies and establish procedures and standards 
to enable the future operation of UAVs in the NAS [1,2].  Recognizing that safety is a 
fundamental requirement for operating in the NAS, a safety-focused approach was taken 
in this report is to inform future civil UAV policy-making.  A systematic analysis of the 
safety considerations for operating different classes of UAVs in the NAS was performed.  
The goal of the analysis is to understand how to achieve the potential public benefit of 
UAV operations, while also protecting the public from harm. 
1.2 Motivation 
The employment of UAVs by the United States armed forces has been rapidly 
increasing.  A Department of Defense report on UAV reliability [3] included the 
cumulative flight hours from 1987 to 2002 for three UAV types: the Pioneer, Hunter, and 
Predator, aggregated shown in the first part of Figure 1.  Since the publication of the 
report, UAVs have been deployed in significant numbers in support of recent conflicts.  
In addition, the Army began operations of the Shadow tactical UAV, and the Air Force 
deployed the Global Hawk.  In light of these recent events, the operational trends after 
2002 have also been estimated and included in Figure 1.  The estimates are based on 
15 
 reported operational milestones from manufacturers and the press1 .  Based on these 
estimates, U.S. military utilization of UAVs has been growing exponentially since 1988, 
and doubled from 2002 to 2004. 
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Figure 1: U.S. Military UAV Flight Hours 
Military utilization of UAVs has proven the operational viability of a diverse set 
of unmanned aircraft and has led to significant demand for the use of UAVs for civil and 
commercial applications in domestic airspace [7].  A broad range of UAVs have been 
used to perform both civil and military missions.  Four examples of currently operated 
civil and military UAVs are shown in Figure 2.  The APV-3 and Helios UAVs have been 
used to demonstrate civil applications by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA).  The Dragon Eye and Global Hawk have been employed by the 
U.S. Army and Air Force respectively in recent conflicts.  While the UAVs have been 
divided between civil and military applications in Figure 2, the distinction is not 
necessarily absolute.  Airframes can be utilized for multiple applications. 
                                                 
1 In 2004, the Predator reached an operational milestone of 100,000 hours [4], the Hunter, 50,000 hours 
[5], and the Shadow 10,000 hours [6]. 
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Figure 2: Examples of Current Civil & Military UAVs 
There is a significant latent demand for the ability to operate UAVs for a variety 
of applications in civil airspace.  However, a lack of federal regulations has been a barrier 
to achieving routine operation in the NAS.  Current federal rules governing unmanned 
aircraft are limited in scope to recreational model aircraft, unmanned balloons, kites, and 
rockets.  Any UAV flight in the NAS that is not governed under the existing rules must 
be individually approved through a Certificate of Authorization (COA), a process for 
exemption from current regulations.  The process was originally utilized for non-routine 
military UAV operations in civil airspace.  It is therefore lengthy and inefficient when 
applied to many civil operations, requiring detailed review and approval by FAA 
authorities for each individual flight to be conducted in the NAS. 
The combined action of regulatory agencies, UAV manufacturers, and research 
into enabling technologies is expected to result in a significant increase in civil UAV 
operations in the future.  The character and scope of UAV operations will depend upon 
the regulatory requirements placed on civil UAV systems.  With their potential utility for 
a variety of applications, it is in the public interest to achieve the full potential benefit of 
UAV operations, while maintaining an acceptable level of safety. 
17 
 1.3 Approach 
The goal of this report is to systematically examine the safety implications of the 
operation of different classes of UAVs in the NAS.  To accomplish this goal, it is first 
necessary to provide background on the military history of UAV operations and current 
efforts to effect civil UAV regulations.  Next, the structure and procedures of the 
National Airspace System are examined, with an emphasis on how air traffic 
management functions of vehicle control and traffic avoidance are currently performed 
and may be implemented for a variety of UAV architectures.  The performance 
characteristics of several current UAVs are examined, and a general classification scheme 
differentiated primarily by mass is introduced.  Finally, the regulatory bases for UAV 
safety are examined, including the federal legal mandate and authority of the FAA for 
UAV safety and current rules governing model aircraft, unmanned balloons, kites, and 
rockets, and the COA process. 
To understand the safety implications of future UAV operations in the NAS, a 
safety analysis was performed according to FAA system safety guidelines.  A model was 
developed to describe the estimated rate of occurrence of two critical hazards to the 
public due to UAV operations: ground impact and midair collision.  From the results of 
the model, the implications for potential low risk UAV operations were analyzed.  
Potential approaches for controlling and mitigating the risk were identified and discussed 
as part of a general framework for evaluating their effectiveness, and recommendations 
were made on the potential requirements for integrating different classes of UAVs in the 
NAS. 
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 Chapter 2
2 Background 
Background
2.1 Expanding Role of Military UAV Operations 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) were first used by the military in 1917 when 
the Navy commissioned the design of an “aerial torpedo” for use against German U-
boats.  A contract was awarded to the Curtiss Aeroplane Company, and the airplane was 
named the Speed-Scout.  According to a history of unmanned aircraft [12], the Curtiss 
Speed-Scout was designed to be launched from Navy ships carrying a 1,000 lb. payload 
and to be stabilized by an autopilot.  The Speed-Scout suffered several failures before it 
achieved its first successful flight on March 6, 1918, marking the first flight of a UAV. 
The early role of UAVs was not much different from the role of the Speed-Scout.  
Unmanned aircraft continued military service as expendable weapons delivery platforms 
or as aerial targets.  As technology matured, UAVs began to be used increasingly as 
military reconnaissance assets.  The Firebee was the first notable UAV to be used 
routinely by the U.S. as a military reconnaissance asset, flying 3,435 sorties during the 
Vietnam Conflict [13].  Firebee UAVs were launched on preprogrammed routes, 
returning to a designated area where their payload was recovered to analyze the 
intelligence gathered. 
The Israeli Air Force pioneered the use of modern unmanned aircraft in the 1970s 
and 80.  In contrast to previous operations, Israeli UAVs were controlled and the 
intelligence monitored in real time.  The success of this type of operation led the U.S. 
military to acquire the Israeli-designed Pioneer [14] in 1986.  The military continued 
acquiring other UAV types and made extensive use of UAVs in the first Gulf War, flying 
520 sorties during the conflict [13]. 
UAVs continued to demonstrate their utility in recent conflicts.  The need for 
UAV reconnaissance was so urgent in Afghanistan, that the Global Hawk was rushed into 
service while still in a developmental stage of acquisition.  Real time vehicle control and 
near-instantaneous dissemination of information has also become routine.  In Global 
19 
 Hawk’s continued service in the second Iraq conflict, portions of the mission were 
controlled via satellite from Beale AFB in California [15], far removed from the theater 
of operations. 
The utility of UAVs has also been reflected in increased military procurement 
rates.  The armed forces’ inventory of UAVs has been steadily increasing, with 90 
vehicles in inventory in 2001 [13], 163 in 2003[14], and projections of 249 by the end of 
2007 [14].  Branches of the U.S. military currently operate five large UAV types – 
Global Hawk, Predator, Pioneer, Hunter, and Shadow.  Individual military units also 
operate smaller UAVs, such as the 4 lb. Raven & Dragon Eye, 7 lb. Desert Hawk, 10 lb. 
Pointer, and 30 lb. Scaneagle. 
The U.S. military was one of the early proponents for UAV operations in the 
NAS, for the purpose of repositioning aircraft between bases.  The current COA 
procedures were initially formulated for military UAV operations1, and considerations for 
NAS operations were first introduced into the design of the Global Hawk with the 
inclusion of the Traffic Collision and Avoidance System (TCAS) [16].  Military UAVs 
are likely to be used initially as platforms for civil and commercial applications, because 
military demand drives the majority of the current market for airframes. 
The safety of UAVs in military operations has been improving significantly.  
Combined yearly accident rates for the Pioneer, Hunter, and Predator UAVs from a 
Department of Defense study on UAV reliability [13] are compared to historical accident 
rates for manned military and civil aviation from a variety of sources2 in Figure 3.  There 
are several differentiating factors in design and operation between military and civil 
aircraft that can confound a direct comparison of accident rates3.  However, a comparison 
of the trends in accident rates is noteworthy.  UAV accident rates have been decreasing 
rapidly since the introduction of modern UAV operations in U.S. military service in 
                                                 
1 The COA procedures are outlined in FAA Order 7610.4 Special Military Operations 
2 General and Commercial Aviation accidents statistics were reported by the National Transportation Safety 
Board [17].  Air Force Aviation Class A mishap rates were published in an Air Force Safety Center 
presentation [19].  UAV are included in the category of Air Force Aviation 
3 Apart from differences in operation, accidents are also defined differently.  The NTSB defines an accident 
as any time a fatality or serious injury occurs or there is “substantial damage” to an aircraft.  The military 
defines a Class A mishap based on the occurrence of a fatality, complete loss of an aircraft, or damage to 
government property in excess of $1 million [20] 
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 1987.  A projection of the current trend would cause UAVs to approach the current 
accident rates in general aviation and manned military aviation. 
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Figure 3: Comparison of Accident Rate Trends between Several Categories of 
Aircraft 
2.2 Effort Toward Civil UAV Operations 
The success of recent military UAV deployments, and the desire for expanded 
markets by UAV manufacturers has led to an increasing interest, both in the United 
States and abroad, for performing a variety of missions in civil airspace.  Several efforts 
to demonstrate civil applications, craft new UAV regulations, and improve the safety of 
UAVs are currently underway.  The efforts are likely to result in the emergence of 
significant future UAV operations in the NAS. 
There is a broad range of potential civil and commercial applications for which 
UAVs are attractive platforms.  Several applications for UAVs that have been proposed 
or demonstrated are summarized in Table 1.  The list is not comprehensive, but is meant 
to highlight the broad range of potential applications considered.  In the United States, the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) began demonstrating civil UAV 
operations under the Environmental Research and Sensor Technology (ERAST) program.  
In ERAST, NASA partnered with several UAV manufacturers to develop and 
demonstrate UAVs for earth science missions.  NASA continues to develop technology 
21 
 and demonstrate UAV operations for a range of potential applications through research 
programs [21] and the formation of a UAV applications center at NASA Ames [22]. 
 
Table 1: Attractive UAV Applications 
 
Remote Sensing 
• Pipeline Spotting 
• Powerline Monitoring 
• Volcanic Sampling 
• Mapping 
• Meteorology 
• Geology 
• Agriculture 
 
Disaster Response 
• Chemical Sensing 
• Flood Monitoring 
• Wildfire Management 
Surveillance 
• Law Enforcement 
• Traffic Monitoring 
• Coastal/ Maritime Patrol 
• Border Patrol 
 
Search and Rescue 
 
Transport 
• Cargo Transport 
 
Comm Relay 
• Internet 
• Cellular Phone 
 
Delivery 
• Firefighting 
• Crop Dusting 
• Package Delivery 
 
Entertainment 
• Cinematography 
• Advertising 
 
Broadcast 
• Television/ Radio 
 
 
 
 
Recognizing the lack of regulations as a barrier to routine operations, there are 
several efforts underway both in the United States and internationally craft UAV 
regulations and to define procedures to enable routine UAV operations in civil airspace.  
In the United States, the push for new regulations is being led by a consortium of UAV 
manufacturers, NASA, and the Department of Defense, known as Access Five, with the 
goal of achieving routine operations for high altitude, long endurance (HALE) UAVs [7].  
Parallel efforts are underway to develop consensus-based UAV standards through 
separate committees convened by the American Society of Testing Materials (ASTM) 
[23] and the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) [24,25].  The purpose 
of the committees’ efforts is to advise future FAA UAV Regulations. 
International regulatory efforts are also underway.  In Europe, the USICO project 
(UAV Safety Issues for Civil Operations) funded by the European Commission is also 
focused on achieving civil and commercial UAV operations in European airspace.  The 
United Kingdom has published advisory material on operating UAVs in civil airspace 
[26], and Australia has enacted regulations allowing certification of several classes of 
UAV operations [27]. 
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 Chapter 3
3 Key Issues in UAV Operations in the NAS 
Key Issues in UAV Operations in the NAS
The National Airspace System (NAS) has evolved to support safe operation and 
equitable access to resources by a diverse range of users.  The procedures, performance, 
and architecture of the NAS have evolved primarily to support manned operations.  
Therefore, when considering the potential unmanned aircraft, there are several issues 
related to the ability of UAVs to integrate with the other users of the NAS according to 
established procedures and architecture. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the safety issues in UAV operations in 
the NAS.  First, the current airspace and operational rules of the NAS are introduced.  
Next, the functioning of the air traffic management system is investigated, and potential 
UAV architectures for control and traffic surveillance are introduced.  Finally, UAV 
performance capabilities are discussed, with implications for integration in the NAS and 
to define general classifications in the following safety analysis. 
3.1 NAS Overview 
The National Airspace System (NAS) is the collection of procedures, regulations, 
infrastructure, aircraft, and personnel that compose the national air transportation system 
of the United States.  The purpose of the system is to safely facilitate air transportation 
and provide equitable access to both air and ground-side aviation resources.  The 
infrastructure of the NAS has evolved to support navigation and air commerce of manned 
aircraft.  Elements of the infrastructure include federal airways, radio navigational aides, 
airports, surveillance, and air traffic control service facilities.  The system is governed by 
United States law and the federal aviation regulations, which govern both the design and 
operation of aircraft within the system, as well as structures on the ground that affect air 
navigation.  The basis of the FAA’s authority over UAVs will be further examined in 
Chapter 4. 
23 
 3.1.1 Visual and Instrument Flight Rules 
There are two different modes of flight rules governing operations in the NAS: 
visual flight rules (VFR), and instrument flight rules (IFR).  The purpose of the 
distinction between VFR and IFR is to require different procedures for navigation, 
landing, and separation of traffic depending upon the availability of visual cues to the 
pilot of an aircraft.  In visual meteorological conditions (VMC), there is sufficient 
visibility allowing the pilot to fly the aircraft through outside cues and to see and avoid 
other aircraft.  In contrast, in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), reliance on 
onboard instrumentation for navigation is required, as well as procedural separation from 
other traffic through air traffic control.  To fly under IFR, pilots must receive additional 
training and certification, and aircraft must have additional instrumentation. 
The distinction between visual and instrument flight rules is most relevant to 
UAV operation in the context of traffic avoidance.  Visual flight rules can serve as one 
foundation for a required level of performance of UAV sensors.  By this potential 
standard, the UAV’s sensors would be required to replicate the performance and 
functionality of the human eye, and the total system to be equivalent in design to a pilot’s 
presence in the cockpit.1  The distinction between VFR and IFR is also important when 
considering the visibility of UAVs to other aircraft, and how other pilots might be 
required to identify and avoid collisions with the UAV. 
3.1.2 Airspace Classifications 
Airspace over the United States is divided into restricted, controlled, and 
uncontrolled airspace.  The airspace where operations are under the direct control of the 
FAA is outside of restricted airspace and is generally referred to as civil airspace.  The 
FAA has divided civil airspace over the United States and within 3 nm of the coast into 
six different classes, which are shown in a simplified diagram in Figure 4.  The 
classifications separate regions of the airspace by the level of service provided by air 
traffic control, the type and density of operations conducted in the airspace, and the level 
of safety required [29].  Airspace classification has the effect of procedurally separating 
                                                 
1 FAA Order 7610.4 [28] requires the UAV applicant to provide a method for traffic avoidance at an 
“equivalent level of safety, comparable to see-and-avoid requirements for manned aircraft.” 
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 air traffic, and therefore procedures for different UAV classes are likely to depend upon 
the airspace in which they operate. 
 
Source: FAA 
Figure 4: FAA Airspace Classes 
Classes A, B, C, D, and E are referred to as controlled airspace, and Class G is 
uncontrolled airspace.  Each class has defined boundaries and weather minimums for 
VFR flight which are described in the FAA’s Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) 
[29], and on aeronautical navigational charts.  A detailed discussion is beyond the scope 
of this report.  The important aspects of airspace classification relevant to UAV 
operations are the general restrictiveness of each airspace class, communications and 
entry requirements, and separation services provided by air traffic control.  These 
parameters are summarized in Table 2, with information from the FAA [30]. 
Table 2: Summary of Characteristics of Controlled Airspace 
Airspace 
Class Communications 
Entry 
Requirements 
Separation 
Provided 
Minimum Pilot 
Qualifications 
A Required ATC clearance All aircraft Instrument Rating 
B Required ATC clearance All aircraft Private or Student 
Certificate (location 
dependent) 
C Required Two-way 
communications 
prior to entry 
VFR from IFR Student certificate 
D Required Two-way 
communications 
prior to entry 
Runway 
operations 
Student certificate 
E Not required for VFR None for VFR None for VFR Student certificate 
G Not Required None None Student certificate 
 
From the requirements, it can be seen that the restrictiveness of airspace decreases 
in alphabetical order from Class A to Class G.  The separation services provided by air 
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 traffic control also vary as the restrictiveness of the aircraft decreases, based on the 
density and type of operations in the class of airspace. 
3.2 Air Traffic Management System 
Air traffic management (ATM) is the process by which air traffic control (ATC), 
separates and controls air traffic in the NAS.  The ATM architecture varies depending 
upon the separation services provided by air traffic control, as discussed in the previous 
section.  In considering UAV operations, there are two key technological areas that 
differentiate UAV architectures within the ATM system: vehicle control, and traffic 
surveillance and avoidance.  By removing the pilot from direct operation of the vehicle, 
UAVs introduce the potential for different control and traffic surveillance methods that 
still preserve the overall function of the ATM system.  This section will introduce the 
current system, define general UAV ATM architectures, and then discuss specific 
architectures that have been utilized or proposed. 
3.2.1 Current System 
A simplified diagram of current commercial aircraft in the ATM system, adapted 
from Hansman, et. al. [31], is shown in Figure 5.  The notation is based on the semi-
structured decision framework [32] developed to represent human/automation allocation 
in mixed-control systems.  For the purposes of this report, blocks in the diagram represent 
controllers in the system, with the dashed blocks representing surveillance processes that 
have been decomposed to specific processes inside the boundary.  Information flows and 
interfaces between processes are also included. 
In the current ATM system of Figure 5, Air Traffic Control surveils the position 
of aircraft, and separates aircraft by issuing commands to the pilot through VHF radio.  
The pilot controls the aircraft through the aircraft systems at varying levels of control and 
receives feedback through cockpit displays.  Onboard surveillance of other air traffic is 
also available through two sources.  First, direct sensing of other traffic through visual 
search is possible with the pilot onboard the aircraft.  The second source is the Traffic 
Collision and Avoidance System (TCAS), which is required equipage for most transport 
aircraft.  This decision-aiding system receives transponder signals from cooperative 
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 traffic in the vicinity.  The cooperative traffic surveilled by the system encodes altitude 
information in the transponder signals.  The transponder signals are then used to localize 
the traffic and report the traffic’s altitude to the system.  If a conflict is detected, TCAS 
advises the pilot on an appropriate vertical avoidance maneuver. 
 
Figure 5: Simplified Diagram of Current Air Traffic Management System 
3.2.2 General UAV System 
UAVs present several new opportunities to utilize advanced technology for 
avoiding traffic, controlling the aircraft, and communicating with air traffic control.  
UAVs will also have potentially different control architectures than the current ATM 
system.  The general UAV control architecture, with several potential surveillance paths 
and control interfaces is shown in Figure 6. 
In comparison to the manned aircraft process in Figure 5, in UAV operation there 
is a physical separation between the operator and aircraft.  This separation necessitates 
the use of a link between operator and vehicle, which has associated bandwidth and 
latency limitations.  The separation also necessitates a separate physical control 
environment on the ground, shown by the ground station.  UAVs typically have the 
addition of a sensor operator that controls the payload of the UAV to receive information 
from the environment, and may utilize an operational controller to coordinate the 
activities of the UAV. 
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 The two key areas of technology that are useful in differentiating UAV 
architectures are the control capability of the UAV onboard systems and the surveillance 
path to other traffic.  The control capability of the onboard systems is referred to as the 
level of autonomy of the UAV.  In Figure 6, the task allocation of different elements of 
the system, as well as the information transmitted across interfaces will vary depending 
upon the capability and mode of the automation.  The path of surveillance information 
will also define the architecture of the system.  An important distinction must be made 
between the surveillance of cooperative traffic, which is capable of broadcasting its 
position through a transponder, and noncooperative, which does not broadcast a 
transponder signal.  Surveillance technologies are defined by their ability to detect the 
two different traffic types.  Several interfaces are possible between controllers in the 
system.  The presence of an interface for specific types of operation depends upon the 
technology available and the performance requirements of the operation.  Specific 
examples will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Figure 6: General UAV Air Traffic Management System 
3.2.3 Potential UAV Architectures 
There is a broad range of potential architectures that fit within the general 
framework of Figure 6.  When referring to specific architectures, distinctions must be 
made along the two previously identified technology areas: UAV onboard system control 
capability (e.g. autonomy) and traffic surveillance source.  Categories of UAV onboard 
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 autonomy capabilities can be defined in the context of vehicle operation, which refers to 
the task of planning, navigating, and piloting the vehicle.  Potential categories of vehicle 
control are outlined in Table 3, modified from the Air Force Research Lab taxonomy for 
levels of vehicle autonomy [33], along with a description of how UAV control is 
executed under each category.  The categories are ordered in decreasing functional 
capability of the UAV onboard systems. 
Table 3: Categories of UAV Control 
Category of 
Vehicle Control Description 
Autonomous & 
Adaptive 
The UAV is controlled completely by UAV onboard systems without 
intervention by an operator or use of a ground station.  The UAV has the 
ability to replan during the flight to account for changes in the environment or 
new objectives.  The UAV may also have the capability to communicate with 
other controllers in the system. 
  
Monitored The UAV operates autonomously, while an operator monitors feedback from 
the UAV.  The operator does not have the ability to control the UAV, but 
could potentially take control actions through other actors in the system. 
  
Supervisory Low level control is executed by the UAV systems onboard the UAV or 
ground station.  The operator remains engaged in the control loop executing 
higher level control of the UAV’s trajectory or state. 
  
Autonomous & 
Non-Adaptive 
The UAV has the ability to execute pre-programmed actions without input 
from an operator, but does not have the ability to change the plan during flight 
or adapt to external disturbances. 
  
Direct The operator directly controls the UAV control surfaces, mediated by the link 
between the UAV and ground station 
 
Current research on UAV autonomy has been conducted in several areas, for a 
general review, see Clough [34].  The majority of the research focuses on extending UAV 
capabilities to robustly form and execute plans with minimal human input.  This “higher 
level” autonomy research is primarily performed by the military to improve battlefield 
capabilities and reduce the number of operators required to control one or multiple 
UAVs.  Additional research is conducted at an enabling level to improve technology and 
methods for a given task, with application to several domains.  Research included in this 
category is image processing research for collision avoidance sensing, voice recognition 
for control, and trajectory optimization. 
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 The second key technological area that defines UAV architectures is the source of 
traffic surveillance.  Methods of traffic avoidance will vary depending on the source and 
capabilities of the surveillance and the responsibility for maintaining traffic separation.  
Three potential surveillance paths are present in Figure 6: onboard surveillance, ground-
based surveillance, and ATC surveillance sources.  Descriptions of several types of 
technology utilized for surveillance that fit these categories are included in Table 4.  
Surveillance by a chase aircraft is a special surveillance category that does not fit into the 
three potential paths described above.  It is a special case, with an additional manned 
aircraft flying formation with the UAV and performing the required surveillance 
functions for the UAV. 
Table 4: Sources of Traffic Surveillance 
Source of Traffic 
Surveillance Description 
ATC Ground-
Based 
Surveillance 
The current primary and secondary radars utilized by ATC.  Update rates vary 
depending upon the location of the radar.  Primary radar is capable of 
surveilling all traffic, but secondary radar relies on transponder signals to 
provide altitude information to air traffic control.. 
  
Operator Ground-
Based 
Surveillance 
Individual radar or other surveillance source located on the ground in the area 
where the UAV is operated.  Provides surveillance of other air traffic to the 
UAV operator or transmitted to the UAV’s onboard systems. 
  
Sight Direct surveillance of other air traffic by the operator’s line of sight on the 
ground.  Requires the UAV to be operated close to the operator and also within 
the operator’s line of sight. 
  
Onboard 
(noncooperative) 
Surveillance source onboard the UAV that has the capability to detect 
noncooperative targets.  The detection can be accomplished through active 
transmission and reflection of energy, or through passive means. 
  
Onboard 
(cooperative) 
Surveillance source onboard the UAV that is only capable of detecting 
cooperative traffic through broadcast signals from the other traffic.  The 
broadcast may provide horizontal or vertical information, or both. 
  
Chase aircraft An aircraft flying in formation with the UAV provides the capabilities of a 
manned aircraft with the operation of the UAV. 
  
Broadcast No traffic surveillance is provided to the UAV, but the UAV could transmit its 
position to other aircraft or air traffic control. 
  
Visibility No traffic surveillance is provided to the UAV, but the UAV is made highly 
visible to facilitate avoidance by other aircraft 
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 The majority of current UAV-related research efforts are focused in the area of 
collision avoidance.  Collision avoidance research is categorized primarily by its 
applicability to cooperative or noncooperative traffic.  In the category of avoidance of 
cooperative threats, the Air Force has commissioned a study to certify the Traffic 
Collision and Avoidance System (TCAS) for use on the Global Hawk UAV [16].  The 
recertification is necessary because TCAS was not originally designed with high lateral 
fidelity, and the Global Hawk has significantly different climb characteristics than most 
aircraft, and therefore generates different midair collision encounter scenarios than 
originally envisioned in the certification of TCAS.  For sensing of noncooperative traffic, 
research on several sensors has been conducted, with an emphasis on reduced weight.  
Specific technologies include infra-red sensors [35], optical sensors, and laser radar 
(LIDAR). 
Central to the importance of UAV surveillance technologies is the ability to meet 
or exceed the performance of current manned aircraft in traffic detection.  In 2003, 
NASA performed a flight test between a UAV and several other aircraft with varying 
performance capabilities [36].  The test evaluated two systems for traffic avoidance: a 
radar mounted on the UAV to detect noncooperative targets and a traffic advisory system, 
for cooperative targets.  The flight test also informally tested the pilot’s acquisition 
capabilities.  The conclusions from the flight test were mixed.  Only the traffic advisory 
system was sufficient for all encounter scenarios.  The radar had a limited range of 4 
miles, which did not detect targets with enough time to maneuver and avoid a collision.  
The test pilots reported that their effective range for picking up an aircraft was 1-1.5 nm.  
Additional research has focused on sensor performance levels to maintain an equivalent 
level of safety to current midair collision rates [37].  This line of investigation also found 
that the human eye was inadequate to detect and prevent collisions under several 
potential scenarios.  The results show that even with current surveillance sources, some 
collisions may not be preventable, and even limited sensors perform better than the 
human eye. 
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 3.2.4 Architectures of Example UAV Operations 
A variety of different architectures have been utilized by current unmanned 
aircraft operations, such as weather balloons or model aircraft, for which the governing 
rules and regulations will be discussed in Chapter 4.  In Table 5, the surveillance and 
control methods for several examples of current and proposed future concepts have been 
included, along with a description of their operation.  For each system, the architecture 
has also been drawn according to the general architecture presented in Figure 6, with 
elements grayed out that are not present in the system. 
Table 5: Control and Surveillance Methods for Example UAV Systems 
 
UAV System 
Control/ 
Surveil. 
Method Description Shown in 
Model 
Aircraft 
Direct / Sight Model aircraft are operated by radio-
control, and operators are responsible for 
maintaining visual contact with their aircraft 
and separation from full-scale aircraft [38] 
Figure 7
    
Weather 
Balloon 
Monitored / 
Visibility 
Weather balloons are released into the 
atmosphere, and are not controlled after 
release.  They are required to be visible to 
air traffic control through position reports or 
radar returns, and visible to other aircraft for 
avoidance 
Figure 8
    
Global Hawk, 
Access Five 
Concept 
Supervisory / 
ATC; 
Cooperative 
Onboard 
The Air Force operates the global hawk in 
Class A airspace through supervisory 
control and air traffic control collision 
avoidance.  This is the first step of access 
five plans for HALE operations in the NAS 
[7] 
Figure 9
    
NASA 
Vineyard 
Demonstration 
Supervisory/ 
Individual 
Ground Radar 
A recent NASA demonstration utilized local 
radar to avoid traffic in the NAS while 
performing an agricultural surveillance 
mission over a vineyard in California [39] 
Figure 10
    
Autonomous 
& Adaptive 
Concept 
Autonomous & 
Adaptive / 
ATC; Uncoop 
Onboard  
As yet unrealized concept.  The UAV would 
be capable of communicating and 
complying with ATC instructions, and 
actively avoiding other aircraft.  A customer 
would receive information directly from the 
UAV. 
Figure 11
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Model 
Airplane 
Figure 7: Radio-Controlled / Model Aircraft Operation in the NAS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weather 
Balloon 
Figure 8: Weather Balloon Operation in the NAS 
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High Altitude 
Long Endurance 
UAV 
Figure 9: HALE/ Access 5 Concept of Operation 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: NASA Vineyard Demonstration Mission 
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Rendering of NASA 
21st Century Aerial 
Vehicle Concept 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Autonomous & Adaptive UAV Concept 
From the previous examples, there is a broad range of potential architectures for 
UAV operation that can provide traffic avoidance capabilities and vehicle control.  
Current UAV systems have yet to demonstrate the ability to autonomously adapt to 
changes in the environment and respond to air traffic control commands.  This is likely 
due to the current lack of capability for air traffic to give commands in a form that can be 
utilized directly by aircraft automation, such as datalink.  Compliance with the current 
voice communicated commands is also problematic as speech recognition is still prone to 
errors.  Fully autonomous operation is also limited by the ability of current autonomy 
methods to adapt to unplanned situations and assure safe flight without human 
intervention or supervision. 
3.3 UAV Performance Capabilities 
In considering future UAV operations in the NAS, it is important to recognize that 
the label “Unmanned Aerial Vehicle” can be applied to vehicles with a broad range of 
configurations, sizes, and performance capabilities.  A general classification 
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 nomenclature representative of common sizes and performance capabilities is useful in 
discussion of safety implications.  This section will examine the performance of current 
UAVs, determine where natural classification boundaries exist, and discuss the safety 
implications of the performance capabilities of each class. 
3.3.1 Potential Classifications 
When referring to UAV classes, there is a mix of nomenclature used from a 
variety of sources, including the military, research community, manufacturers, and 
professional organizations.  The various nomenclatures are based on a variety of 
parameters including mass, vehicle configuration, designed application, level of 
autonomy, type of operation, or military level employment.  There is currently a lack of 
consensus for classification of civil UAVs, although both the UK and Australia have 
developed classifications between “small” and “large” UAVs based on mass [26,27]. 
Current manned aircraft certification classes are primarily differentiated by mass 
as light or heavy1, and by aircraft configurations such as rotary or fixed-wing.  Further 
differentiations are made by type of operation, number of passengers carried, and by the 
type and number of engines.  In UAV systems, the parameters most relevant to risk to the 
general public are the mass and size of the vehicle, its kinetic energy or momentum, and 
the operational capabilities of the aircraft.  To maintain uniformity with current manned 
regulation, UAV classifications were considered with mass as a primary discriminator.  
Performance capabilities were analyzed with respect to mass to determine if natural 
breakpoints in performance were present that allowed the classifications to be 
representative of common operating characteristics.  This analysis of current UAV 
performance was limited to fixed-wing aircraft.  Rotary-wing UAVs are primarily 
designed for operation close to the ground, therefore mass is the most likely discriminator 
of that class of aircraft. 
Five categories of current UAVs were defined for this analysis from a 
combination of research and military literature.  The categories are Micro, Mini, Tactical, 
Medium Altitude, and High Altitude.  Medium and High altitude UAVs are also known 
                                                 
1 Certification of light aircraft is governed by FAR Part 23 and are less than 12,500 lb.  Certification of 
heavy aircraft is governed by FAR Part 25, and is greater than 12,500 lb.  They are often referred to as 
Part 23 or Part 25 aircraft. 
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 as Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) or High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) 
UAVs, indicating their ability to stay aloft for long periods of time.  It is also possible 
that an additional category representing a heavy cargo-class UAV will emerge. Because 
current production examples do not exist, this type was not included in the performance 
analysis.  Examples of the UAV mass spectrum are shown in Figure 12, along with 
potential classification boundaries. 
Aerovironment Black
Widow – 2.12 oz.
BAE Systems
Microstar – 3.0 oz.
Sig Kadet II RC
Trainer – 5 lb
Aerovironment
Pointer – 9.6 lb
Boeing/ Insitu Scaneagle – 33 lb
AAI Shadow 200 – 328 lb
Boeing X-45A UCAV – 12,195 lb (est)
Bell Eagle Eye – 2,250 lb 
Allied Aero. LADF – 3.8 lb
NOAA 
Weather 
Balloon 2-
6 lb
Gen. Atomics – Predator B – 7,000 lb
Northrop-Grumman Global Hawk 25,600 lb
UAV Weight (lb)
0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000
Micro Mini Tactical
High Alt / UCAV
Med Alt Heavy
 
Figure 12: Mass Spectrum of Current UAVs 
3.3.2 Performance Analysis 
The performance data for several current UAVs were gathered from UAV 
reference literature [40] and UAV manufacturer reports.  Mass, ceiling, maximum 
endurance, and cruise speed data were assembled for several fixed-wing UAVs that are 
currently in production, operational service, or utilized for research.  A summary of the 
data is included in Appendix A for reference. 
The maximum operating altitude of several current UAVs, is shown in Figure 13, 
along with the boundaries for different classes of controlled airspace.  Micro, Mini, and 
Tactical UAVs show clear breakpoints in mass and maximum altitude.  Micro & Mini 
UAVs are likely to be operated close to the ground and are generally not capable of 
reaching above 5,000 ft. Tactical UAVs occupy a much broader mass range, from 30 to 
37 
 1,000 lb and are primarily distinguished by their ability to operate higher, approaching 
the boundary of Class A airspace at 18,000 ft.  The Seascan UAV is a notable outlier in 
the mini category, with a ceiling of 18,000 ft.  However, it is generally operated similar to 
other Mini UAVs. 
The distinction between Medium and High Altitude UAVs is primarily in their 
operating altitude, but not in vehicle mass.  Medium altitude UAVs are typically operated 
around the region of Class A airspace, while several high alttitude UAVs have the 
capability to be operated above FL 600 into uncontrolled airspace.  For operations in the 
NAS, high altitude aircraft must pass through the same operating range as medium 
altitude aircraft in transit to their operating altitude.  Therefore, they may not present 
different safety considerations than medium altitude aircraft. 
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Figure 13: Maximum Altitude of Current UAVs 
The maximum endurance of several UAVs is shown in Figure 14.  Micro UAVs 
typically have endurances measured in minutes, as they typically carry enough power to 
remain aloft for long periods of time.  As the mass of UAVs increase, the current 
maximum endurance capability also increases exponentially.  Mini UAVs can typically 
be operated for several hours, Tactical on the range of 5-10 hours, and Medium and High 
altitude from 10 hours to days. 
High endurance UAVs may remain in the NAS for over 24 hours, during several 
personnel changes both on the ground and in the NAS.  Several concepts have been 
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 proposed to extend endurance to days or weeks, with UAVs acting as high altitude 
pseudo-satellites, flown above the majority of air traffic.  For long endurance missions, 
component reliability may become a critical factor in the ability to complete the UAV’s 
mission. There also may be more instances of failure due to the longer operation and 
complexity of shift changes. 
 
P
io
ne
er
B
la
ck
 W
id
ow C
en
tu
rio
n
P
oi
nt
er
W
as
p
A
zi
m
ut
P
er
se
us
M
ic
ro
st
ar
S
he
d 
M
k3
E
ag
le
 2
Fo
x
G
na
t
G
na
t 2
P
re
da
to
r
P
re
da
to
r B
P
ro
w
le
rII
H
er
on
S
ea
rc
he
r
S
ea
sc
an
R
ap
to
r
G
lo
ba
l H
aw
k
H
er
m
es
 4
50
S
ha
do
w
 2
00
D
ra
go
n 
E
ye
P
ho
en
ix
S
he
dd
on
E
ag
le
 1
A
la
di
n
Lu
na
A
ltu
s 
II
S
co
ut
H
un
te
r
S
en
de
r
H
er
m
es
 1
80
H
er
m
es
 1
50
0
M
in
i-V
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000
Max TO Weight (lb)
E
nd
ur
an
ce
 (h
r)
 High Alt. / UCAV 
Medium Alt. 
Tactical 
Mini 
Micro 
Micro 
Mini 
Tactical 
High Alt/ UCAV 
Medium Alt.
 
Figure 14: Maximum Endurance of Current UAVs 
Integration of UAVs can be problematic if the UAV’s performance envelope is 
significantly different from other aircraft.  Figure 14 shows the speed-altitude envelope 
for several UAVs.  As the reader may note, most mini, tactical, and rotary UAVs lie on a 
line of increasing speed with increasing altitude.  Mini UAVs typically have a maximum 
speed from 30-90 knots, and tactical from 80-110 kts.  At these altitudes, UAVs can 
achieve the same speed as several other general aviation aircraft.  However, if the UAV is 
loitering at a different speed, it will change the potential collision scenarios.  More 
collisions would be likely to occur where another aircraft is overtaking the UAV, which 
may be especially difficult for forward or side-looking sensors to prevent. 
The characteristics of medium altitude and high altitude class of vehicles could be 
problematic.  Medium altitude aircraft exhibit a wide range of maximum speed 
capabilities from 100 to 200 kts. High altitude aircraft have dramatically different 
maximum speeds.  They range from 20 kts for the solar/electric-powered Helios to 400 
kts for the jet-powered Global Hawk.  Slower speeds in the High Altitude class would be 
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 likely to require special consideration by air traffic control to separate from other aircraft 
during their flight. 
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Figure 15: Speed vs. Altitude of Current UAVs 
3.4 Representative Aircraft for Classification 
The Micro, Mini, Tactical, MALE, and HALE classifications of current UAVs 
capture common size and operating characteristics.  These classifications, representative 
examples, mass and operating ranges are summarized in Table 6.  To represent the 
possibility for air transport-sized cargo UAV operations, a Heavy class of aircraft was 
also added.  The representative aircraft used for analysis from top to bottom are: the 
Aerovironment Black Widow, the Aerovironment Pointer, the AAI Shadow 200, the 
General Atomics Predator A, the Northrop-Grumman Global Hawk, and the McDonnell-
Douglas MD-11.  The UAVs and their characteristics will be used as representative 
examples for the analysis of the ground impact hazard in Chapter 6. 
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Table 6: Summary of Vehicle Classes 
Class Representative Aircraft Mass Range Operating Area 
Operating 
Altitudes 
Micro 
 
Less than 2 lb Local Near-surface to 500 ft 
Mini 
 
2 to 30 lb Local 100 to 10,000 ft 
Tactical 
 
30 to 1,000 lb Regional 1,500 to 18,000 ft 
MALE Regional/ National 18,000 ft to FL 600 
HALE 
 
1,000 to 
30,000 lb Regional/ 
National / 
International 
Above FL 600 
Heavy* 
 
Over 
30,000 lb 
National / 
International 
18,0000 ft to FL 
450 
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 Chapter 4
4 Regulatory Bases for Civil Operation of Unmanned Aircraft 
Regulatory Bases for Civil Operation of 
Unmanned Aircraft
Congress created the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and gave it the 
authority and responsibility to regulate the air transportation system.  While the FAA has 
taken steps to ensure the safety of UAV operations, they have not generally defined an 
unmanned aerial vehicle as a type of aircraft or created specific regulatory procedures for 
all types of UAVs.  Current FAA rules and regulations applicable to unmanned aircraft 
are of limited scope.  Rules have been established governing model aircraft, and current 
regulations apply to the operation of unmanned balloons, kites, and rockets.  Additional 
UAV operations are approved through the Certificate of Authorization process introduced 
earlier.  The myriad of rules governing unmanned aircraft has created uncertainty for 
some members of the UAV community regarding the extent to which different UAV 
types may fall under the jurisdiction of the FAA.  There has also been confusion in the 
model aircraft community regarding an FAA decision that model aircraft used for 
commercial purposes are not governed by currently established model aircraft rules [41]. 
The first half of this chapter outlines the statutory basis for the FAA’s authority 
and safety mandate and how it applies to UAVs.  The second half details the current rules 
and regulations governing the operation of unmanned aircraft.  The investigation shows 
that UAVs fit the general definition of aircraft, but there are precedents for defining other 
aircraft, such as ultralights, as vehicles.  Regardless of classification as vehicles or 
aircraft, regulation of UAVs is consistent with the authority and mandate of the FAA, and 
that there is a legal basis for distinguishing between commercial and recreational 
operations.  Under the FAA’s authority, there are a variety of policy mechanisms that can 
be used to ensure safety of UAV operations in the NAS.  
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 4.1 Legal Basis for FAA Regulation of Aircraft 
The FAA’s mandate to regulate aviation safety is established by Congress and 
present in federal law.  The part of federal law applicable to the FAA’s authority is Title 
49 of the United States Code (referred to as 49 U.S.C.), which governs transportation.  
Subtitle I of Title 49 governs the Department of Transportation in which the FAA resides, 
and Subtitle VII governs aviation programs.  The code is amended by congress through 
reauthorization bills, which establish the budget levels and amend policy priorities of the 
FAA as necessary. 
Federal law states that the Secretary of Transportation, “shall consider … 
assigning and maintaining safety as the highest priority in air commerce” 1  The code 
gives the same charge to the administrator of the FAA, with the added task of “enhancing 
safety.”2  In a separate section describing the duties of the FAA Administrator, federal 
law states that he or she “shall carry out the duties and powers of the Secretary of 
Transportation… related to aviation safety[.]”3
It is important to note that the main clause in federal law giving responsibility for 
safety specifically charges the FAA to maintain safety in air commerce, not merely in 
aviation.  Air commerce is defined in federal law as 
foreign air commerce, interstate air commerce, the transportation of mail by aircraft, the 
operation of aircraft within the limits of a Federal airway, or the operation of aircraft that 
directly affects, or may endanger safety in, foreign or interstate air commerce.4
Within the definitions of foreign and interstate air commerce, air commerce is 
further defined as 
the transportation of passengers or property by aircraft for compensation, the 
transportation of mail by aircraft, or the operation of aircraft in furthering a business or 
vocation.5
The air commerce clause forms a basis for FAA regulation of recreational aircraft 
and aircraft involved in air commerce at different safety levels.  A distinction is also 
made between air commerce and air transportation, where air transportation involves 
                                                 
1 49 U.S.C. §40101 (a) (1) 
2 49 U.S.C. §40101 (d) (1) 
3 49 U.S.C. §106 (g) (1) (A) 
4 49 U.S.C. §40102 (a) (3) 
5 49 U.S.C. §40102 (a) (22), 49 U.S.C. §40102 (a) (24) 
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 using the aircraft as a common carrier of passengers.  The FAA administrator is given the 
mandate to “classify a regulation or standard appropriate to the differences between air 
transportation and other air commerce.”1
There is uncertainty regarding the classification of UAVs as aircraft.  Federal law 
defines an aircraft as “any contrivance invented, used, or designed to navigate, or fly in, 
the air.”2  Broad interpretation of the definition would include UAVs, but could also 
include paper airplanes.  Further understanding can be gained by looking at previous 
FAA rulemaking.  When crafting ultralight regulations, the FAA refers to ultralights as 
vehicles, not aircraft.  In the original preamble of ultralight regulations, ultralights were 
differentiated from other aircraft for purposes of airworthiness and registration.  The 
current language in regulations has been modified, but the distinction between ultralight 
vehicles and other aircraft remains.  Part 91, the general operating and flight rules do not 
apply to ultralight aircraft, which are governed by specific flight rules in Part 103 of the 
Federal Aviation Regulations.  Model aircraft, on the other hand, are specifically referred 
to as aircraft in the advisory circular providing guidelines for their operation [38].  
Nonetheless, model aircraft are not specifically mentioned in regulation, therefore they 
have not formally been defined as aircraft  
The distinction between vehicles and aircraft is still unclear as it applies to several 
classes of UAVs.  Demonstrated by previous rulemaking, the broad legal definition of 
aircraft gives the FAA the authority to further define the term.  Therefore, UAVs still fall 
under the responsibility of the FAA, but specific rules may vary depending upon the 
FAA’s classification of certain UAVs as vehicles or aircraft.  While the safety mandate 
for the FAA is specific to air commerce, the FAA’s authority over all aircraft operated in 
federal airspace is reinforced by federal law that makes it illegal for a person to operate 
an aircraft, unless authorized by the FAA or with limited exceptions3, without being 
registered with the FAA.4  Violation of this law carries potential civil penalties also 
included in the federal code.  Therefore, it is illegal to operate a UAV apart from existing 
rules if not approved by the FAA. 
                                                 
1 U.S.C. §44701 (d) (2) 
2 U.S.C. §40102 (a) (6) 
3 Exceptions to registration requirements are granted mainly for military or foreign aircraft operations, and 
for a reasonable period of time after the transfer of ownership of an aircraft 
4 U.S.C. §40101 (a) 
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 Federal law did not anticipate the operation of unmanned aircraft that present 
harms to the public on the ground, but not to the traveling public.  There is no specific 
legal mandate for the FAA to protect the public on the ground from harm caused by 
aviation.  In practice, FAA regulations are crafted to protect both the general public, and 
all participants in aviation.  Language in federal law is consistent with a general 
responsibility for aviation safety.  Therefore the FAA should continue to ensure the safety 
of the public on the ground due to UAVs. 
4.2 Mechanisms for Safety Regulation 
The FAA exercises authority over aviation through the Federal Aviation 
Regulations (FARs), or Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations.  The components of 
the air transportation system over which the FAA has authority are described by 49 
U.S.C. Chapter 447.  The chapter does not contain language that would differentiate 
between manned and unmanned operation.  By federal law, the FAA has the authority to 
regulate the manufacture and maintenance of civil aircraft, individual and corporate 
operators of aircraft, liability for aircraft accidents, ground infrastructure required for air 
commerce, and the operation and equipage of aircraft operated in controlled airspace.  
The two mechanisms that are of primary importance in this safe study of UAVs are 
airworthiness requirements. 
When a manufacturer obtains a type certification from the FAA, the FAA certifies 
that that aircraft is airworthy to the standard defined by the regulations.  Airworthiness 
means that the aircraft is safe to fly, controllable, can withstand anticipated flight loads, 
and can operate safely over its design life.  Airworthiness standards are set for design of 
general classes of aircraft in the Federal Aviation Regulations1.  Airworthiness is further 
preserved by standards in maintenance and inspection, ensuring that the aircraft is 
remains at a designated level of airworthiness during its operation. 
The FAA also maintains safety by regulating procedures and standards for 
operations in the NAS2.  Operating rules govern the separation of aircraft, responsibilities 
                                                 
1 FAR Parts 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, and 35 
2 General Operating and flight rules are contained in FAR Part 91, with separate operating rules for specific 
classes of aircraft in Parts 101, 103, and 105.  Additional certification and operational rules govern air 
carriers and operations for hire in Subchapter G of the FARs. 
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 of the pilot for navigation and control of the aircraft, and procedures for operating in 
different airspace environments.  The operating rules also recognize different levels of 
control over safety for different aircraft and operational areas of the NAS.  Several 
operating requirements in the federal aviation regulations directly require pilots to 
operate aircraft safely.  Provisions require the pilot to maintain vigilance to see and avoid 
other aircraft1, and preclude the operation of aircraft in a reckless manner that endangers 
another person’s life or property2. 
4.3 Current Unmanned Aircraft Rules 
Several types of UAVs are currently operated in the NAS, enabled by a variety of 
regulatory mechanisms.  Unmanned kites, rockets, and balloons are governed by specific 
FARs, while model aircraft are operated under advisory circular guidelines and an 
established private regulatory mechanism.  Other UAV operations must be approved by 
certificate authorizing an exemption to the regulations.  The three types of operations are 
examined in the context of different mechanisms for enforcing safety, and different 
control architectures applied to current UAV operations. 
4.3.1 Model Aircraft 
Model aircraft, also called radio-controlled (RC) aircraft, are typically flown by 
hobbyists within line of sight.  They may be helicopters or fixed wing aircraft, and also 
may utilize a variety of propulsion types.  The system has evolved such that model 
aircraft are separated from other users of the NAS, and are controlled by private 
guidelines and insurance mechanisms through the Academy of Model Aeronautics 
(AMA). 
The FAA publishes Advisory Circular 91-57 [37], which establishes voluntary 
guidelines for the operation of model aircraft.  The advisory circular states that the 
aircraft should be operated at an altitude less than 400 ft, away from populated areas, and 
not within 3 miles of an airport without notifying the airport operator.  It also states that 
model aircraft should give the right of way to and avoid flying in the vicinity of full scale 
aircraft.  The Academy of Model Aeronautics (AMA) publishes a safety code [42] which 
                                                 
1 FAR § 91.113 
2 FAR § 91.13, § 103.9, § 101.7 
47 
 is enforced at AMA airfields and which must be followed for the AMA’s liability 
insurance to apply.  The safety code specifically incorporates the provisions in AC 91-57, 
and additionally requires that the aircraft be less than 55 lbs, or follow additional 
procedures for approval. 
To ensure the safety of model aircraft operations, there has been an evolved 
responsibility by a private organization for enforcing safety practices, based on federal 
guidelines.  This approach has limits.  Membership in the organization is voluntary, and 
compliance with both FAA procedures and AMA guidelines is also strictly voluntary.  
Therefore, there is limited ability to enforce safe model aircraft practices.  Furthermore, 
recent technological advances are made model aircraft potentially less benign.  Recent 
technological changes have allowed small aircraft to be operated autonomously and 
beyond line of sight.  These technological advancements have also made model aircraft 
attractive camera platforms for limited commercial use.  The FAA has established that 
commercial operation of model aircraft is in violation of the recreational intentions of AC 
91-57 [41]. 
The AMA has recently taken steps to differentiate itself from the broader UAV 
community and maintain its authority over recreational, non-commercial flight of model 
aircraft. Consistent with this distinction, the 2004 AMA safety regulations were changed 
to preclude autonomous and commercial operation [43]: 
A model aircraft is defined as a non-human-carrying device capable of sustained flight in 
the atmosphere not exceeding the limitations established in this Code, exclusively for 
recreation, sport, and/or competition activities. The operators of radio control model 
aircraft shall control the aircraft from the ground and maintain unenhanced visual contact 
with the aircraft throughout the entire flight operation. No aircraft shall be equipped with 
devices that would allow for autonomous flight. 
The language of the 2005 safety code maintained the distinction between 
recreational and commercial operation.  The provision regarding autonomous flight was 
reworded to preclude devises that allow operation beyond the line of sight [42]: 
The operator of a radio-controlled model aircraft shall control it during the entire flight, 
maintaining visual contact without enhancement other than by corrective lenses that are 
prescribed for the pilot. No model aircraft shall be equipped with devices which allow it 
to be flown to a selected location which is beyond the visual range of the pilot. 
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 For model aircraft, the safe operation rests on the assumption that the aircraft will 
be kept small and will be operated under positive control, within line of sight.  The 
enforcement of control is through an established set of practices within the recreational 
aircraft community.  The AMA ensures safety through a published safety code and 
enforcement through insurance protection from liability. 
The enforcement of safety is limited by membership to the organization or 
community.  Therefore, operations of model aircraft still pose a risk to the public on the 
ground and other users of the airspace.  As will be further discussed in Chapter 5, there 
has been several near midair collisions between model aircraft and manned aircraft 
reported in the Aviation Safety Reporting System.  There are also cases where operators 
or bystanders have been fatally wounded by an out of control model aircraft [44]. 
4.3.2 Moored Balloons, Kites, Unmanned Rockets, and Unmanned Free 
Balloons 
FAR Part 101 governs the operation of Moored Balloons, Kites, Unmanned 
Rockets, and Unmanned Free Balloons.  Subpart (a) contains general requirements, while 
Subpart (b) governs unmanned balloons and kites, (c) unmanned rockets, and (d) 
unmanned free balloons.  The regulation proscribes several mechanisms for mitigating 
the risk posed by three categories of objects to other users of the NAS and persons and 
property on the ground.  Operations of the objects do not require positive control by the 
operator or launcher of the balloon, kite, or rocket beyond the initial release.  Therefore, 
the mitigation measures required are passive in nature, and the part does not contain 
analogous “flight rules” to unmanned aircraft. 
While each subpart contains specific exemptions, operation restrictions, and FAA 
notification requirements for each type of vehicle, there are common methods of risk 
control both to persons and property on the ground and other aircraft through weight and 
operating restrictions, and notification and visibility requirements.  Subpart (a) of Part 
101 also generally states that “no person may operate any moored balloon, kite, 
unmanned rocket, or unmanned free balloon in a manner that creates a hazard to other 
persons, or their property.”  It also states that they may not allow an object to be dropped 
from the kite, rocket, or balloon that endangers persons or property. 
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 Several exemptions from Part 101 are made for small-mass, or low-altitude 
operations.  These exemptions allow unregulated use of moored balloons, free balloons, 
and model rockets as long as the criteria for exemption are met.  Requirements for 
exemption vary, but thresholds are set based on a combination of size, mass, material 
construction, density, or operating characteristics the object.  For example, unmanned 
rockets are exempt if they weigh less than 16 oz. and are constructed of paper, wood, or 
breakable plastic, and utilize a form of propellant dictated by the regulations.  Moored 
balloons are exempt if they are less than 6 ft in diameter, and have a gas capacity of less 
than 115 ft3.  Unmanned free balloons must meet several criteria to be exempt for the 
regulations: one of which is the requirement that the weight per surface area of any side 
of the payload may not exceed 3 oz/in2.  The size, density, and material limitations reduce 
the risk of collision the objects pose to other aircraft or the general public. 
The three subparts of Part 101 also contain provisions to restrict operation from 
high-density areas, both around airports and in populated areas, reducing the risk posed to 
the general public and other aircraft.  Moored balloons and unmanned rockets governed 
by Part 101 are prohibited from operating within 5 miles of an airport.  Unmanned free 
balloons may not be operated under 2,000 ft in airspace Classes B, C, D, or E designated 
for an airport.  With respect to protection of persons and property on the ground, 
unmanned rockets governed by Part 101 are not allowed to be operated within 1,500 ft of 
any person who is not involved in the operation, and free balloons are prohibited from 
operating within its first 100 feet of ascent in the vicinity of a “congested city or town,” 
and must not endanger persons or property when it returns to the surface. 
Further restrictions are placed on operation to mitigate potential collisions with 
manned aircraft through visibility requirements.  Objects governed by Part 101 are 
restricted from launch in meteorological conditions where they would not be visible to 
other aircraft.  Both moored and free balloons generally require high visibility pennants 
or streamers to be attached to any line at 50 ft intervals.  Unmanned rockets cannot be 
operated at night, but balloons may be operated at night if they have visible lights on the 
balloon, payload, and attached lines.  Free balloons are also required to be visible to 
ground radar.  The operator is also required to make regular position reports of the 
balloon to the local Air Traffic Control facility unless the requirement is waived. 
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 Notification is also used to control the risk to other aircraft by unmanned and 
uncontrolled operations.  Although details vary, when required the operators generally 
must notify the FAA regional office or air traffic control of the proposed operation 6 to 
24 hours in advance  Notification is required for moored balloons and kites above 150 ft 
and unmanned rockets and balloons governed by Part 101.  Notification are usually 
published as notice to airmen or provided by air traffic control to traffic in the area to 
alert them to the potential of the other objects in the airspace. 
Safety for the kites, balloons, and rockets that are operated under Part 101 is 
achieved a combination of factors.  Ambient levels of risk are reduced by separating 
operations from high density areas.  The potential for midair collisions is reduced through 
visibility requirements or notification to air traffic control.  The visibility requirements 
for balloons and kites are in place so piloted aircraft can avoid the objects, without 
requiring the objects to avoid manned aircraft.  Should a collision occur, the magnitude of 
potential harm is reduced by limitations on the size, density, and construction of the 
objects. 
4.3.3 Certificate of Authorization 
All UAV flights within the NAS not operated as model aircraft or under FAR Part 
101 must be approved under a certificate of authorization (COA) from the FAA, 
authorizing an exception to the current regulations.  The UAV COA guidelines were 
initially formulated for military UAV flights within the NAS, and are contained in FAA 
Order 7610.4 – Special Military Operations [28].  The military standards have since been 
applied to civil UAV operations as well.  From the order, the application for the COA 
must be made to the regional FAA office where the flights will take place, and must 
include the following elements: 
1. Detailed description of the intended flight operation including the classification of the 
airspace to be utilized. 
2. ROA physical characteristics.   
3. Flight performance characteristics.   
4. Method of pilotage and proposed method to avoid other traffic.   
5. Coordination procedures. 
6. Communications procedures  
7. Route and altitude procedures. 
8. Lost link/mission abort procedures.   
9. A statement from the DOD [or commercial] proponent that the ROA is airworthy.   
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The COA process is used to approve an exception to current regulations. 
Therefore, it requires lengthy lead time for approval and extensive planning prior to a 
UAV mission.  As an exception process, it also forces a very conservative approach to 
ensuring safety, often limiting the area of operation and requiring adherence to a pre-
determined flight path.   The provisions of the COA allow the approving authority to 
ensure both the airworthiness of the UAV and to define procedures for operating the 
UAV.  By a review instead of regulation process, the same mechanisms for safety that are 
enforced for manned aircraft are also enforced for UAVs. 
Each UAV COA must be reviewed by regional FAA authorities, resulting in 
different standards depending upon the approving authority.  Additional differences in 
procedures are introduced between civil and military UAV operations, which are also 
approved through separate FAA departments.  The process is inefficient, and does not 
result in clear standards for users to follow in designing UAV applications. 
4.4 Conclusions 
From federal law, it is clear that the FAA has the responsibility and authority for 
ensuring the safe operation of UAVs in the NAS.  There are also several mechanisms 
currently used to ensure the safety of unmanned aircraft depending upon the nature of 
risk posed by the operations, and the type of system.  The currently established rules 
governing UAV operations are limited in scope.  If routine operations are to be achieved, 
it is necessary to counter the inefficiency of the detailed COA process by crafting new 
UAV regulations based on FAA system safety standards.  The methodology for assessing 
risk according FAA system safety guidelines is presented in the next chapter.  The safety 
analysis examines the risk to the general public on the ground and in other aircraft posed 
by different UAV operation to inform future UAV rulemaking. 
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 Chapter 5
5 System Safety Analysis 
System Safety Analysis
The use of UAVs, like other aviation technologies, poses a potential harm to the 
general public.  This potential harm is measured by the metric of risk, which is defined as 
both the “likelihood of an accident, and the severity of the potential consequences.” [45] 
As discussed in Chapter 4, it is the responsibility of the Federal Aviation Administration 
to ensure the safety of UAV operations in the NAS.  FAA Order 8040.4 [46] specifies 
that a risk management process should be applied to all high-consequence decisions by 
the FAA, which includes the incorporation of a new class of aircraft in the NAS.  
Published in support of Order 8040.4, the FAA System Safety Handbook (SSH) [47] 
provides general guidance to FAA personnel and contractors on implementing a risk 
management process but does not supersede existing regulations.  Other system safety 
regulations include advisory circulars for systems in Part 23 and 25 aircraft [48,49]. 
FAA system safety policies were used as guidance to investigate the safety 
considerations for operation of UAVs in the NAS.  The purpose of this chapter is to 
outline the methodology used in the system safety analysis.  The methodology includes 
both the identification of adverse effects and determination of the risk of each of the 
effects.  In addition, the regulatory requirements on target levels of safety were also 
compared to current levels of safety for the two critical hazards identified: ground impact 
and midair collision. 
5.1 Risk Assessment Methodology 
To determine the safety implications of potential UAV operations, a risk 
assessment methodology was used.  The first step of a risk assessment is to identify the 
hazards due to the operation of a system, which are situations that present the potential 
for an accident.  Next, the likelihood of occurrence of each hazard is estimated.  The risk 
of a given hazard is defined as the combination of the severity of the hazard and its 
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 likelihood of occurrence.  This approach is outlined in Chapter 7 of the system safety 
handbook, as the process for system hazard identification and risk assessment [47]: 
• Hypothesize the [operational] scenario. 
• Identify the associated hazards. 
• Estimate the credible worst case harm that can occur. 
• Estimate the likelihood of the hypothesized scenario occurring at the level of harm (severity). 
 
The tradeoff in risk management is between the rate of occurrence of adverse 
events and their associated consequences.  This tradeoff is represented by the cause-
consequence matrix shown in Table 7.  The matrix categorizes risk based on four levels 
of occurrence and five levels of potential severity.  Severity and likelihood definitions 
will be further discussed in the next section. 
Table 7: Cause-Consequence Relationship in Risk Management 
Severity/ 
Likelihood 
No Safety 
Effect Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
Probable      
Remote      
Extremely 
Remote      
Extremely 
Improbable      
 
 
High Risk 
Medium Risk 
Low Risk 
 
Hazard identification and risk assessment is typically performed when a full 
description of the system exists.  To compare risk across the broad range of potential 
UAV systems operated in the NAS, there is a need to maintain general applicability in the 
risk assessment process.  To accomplish this, a consequence-based approach to the 
identification of hazards was taken.  This approach focuses the risk assessment on the 
most severe harms due to UAV operations.  The harms are selected and analyzed, 
encompassing the many specific failures that may result in the harm.  From comparison 
to manned aircraft reliability requirements, events with the most severe consequences are 
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 typically the critical design drivers of the system, and this allows a preliminary analysis 
to capture the critical harms relevant to UAV operation.  The risk assessment process 
quantifies the risk of the critical hazards and determines what level of control or 
mitigation is required. 
5.1.1 Severity Classifications 
The FAA defines five classes of severity of consequences in the SSH, ranging 
from “catastrophic” to “no safety effect.”  The explanations of effects that fall under each 
level of severity are included in Table 8.  The severity definitions included the SSH are 
consistent with the advisory material for system safety of Part 23 [48] and Part 25 [49] 
aircraft.   Part 25 does not include the subcategory of hazardous events. 
Table 8: FAA System Safety Handbook Severity Definitions [47] 
Severity Level Definition 
Catastrophic Results in multiple fatalities and/or loss of the system 
Hazardous Reduces the capability of the system or the operator ability to cope with adverse 
conditions to the extent that there would be: 
- Large reduction in safety margin or functional capability 
- Crew physical distress/excessive workload such that operators cannot be relied 
upon to perform required tasks accurately or completely 
Serious or fatal injury to small number of occupants of aircraft (except operators) 
Fatal injury to ground personnel and/or general public 
Major Reduces the capability of the system or the operators to cope with adverse operating 
condition to the extent that there would be  
- Significant reduction in safety margin or functional capability 
- Significant increase in operator workload 
- Conditions impairing operator efficiency or creating significant discomfort 
- Physical distress to occupants of aircraft (except operator) including injuries 
- Major occupational illness and/or major environmental damage, and/or major 
property damage 
Minor Does not significantly reduce system safety.  Actions required by operators are well 
within their capabilities.  Includes: 
- Slight reduction in safety margin or functional capabilities 
- Slight increase in workload such as routine flight plan changes 
- Some physical discomfort to occupants or aircraft (except operators) 
- Minor occupational illness and/or minor environmental damage, and/or minor 
property damage 
No Safety Effect Has no effect on safety 
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 One of the fundamental differences in the safety process of UAVs compared to 
manned aircraft is apparent in Table 8.  The severity definitions related to occupants of 
the aircraft do not apply to an unmanned system.  In UAV operation, the most severe 
possible outcomes are those that result in injury to the general public, either in other 
aircraft or on the ground.  Although a catastrophic event is defined as resulting in 
multiple fatalities and/or the loss of the entire system, it is likely that the loss of system 
criterion will not be applied to UAVs.  The destruction of a UAV system does not 
immediately constitute a safety risk and is therefore not inherently catastrophic. 
The two most severe consequences of UAV operation are catastrophic events, 
which are events that result in multiple fatalities, and hazardous events, which result in a 
small number of fatalities.  Property or environmental damage are potential effects of 
UAV accidents and would be labeled as major.  Consistent with examining the critical 
hazards, events with a category of major and below were not included in this risk 
analysis. 
There are two major types of events that result in harm to the public.  Ground 
impact can endanger the general public, and midair collision with a manned aircraft can 
threaten the safety of the passengers aboard that aircraft.  Both effects are critical system 
design drivers that have implications for UAV operations and reliability requirement.  
Therefore, the two events were further analyzed as the two critical harms in UAV 
operation.  When analyzing ground impact, it is assumed that the event would not result 
in a large number of fatalities, and would therefore be classified as hazardous and not 
catastrophic.  Midair collision should be considered as a catastrophic event. 
There are other harms that are possible due to UAV operation that have not been 
included in the analysis, one of which is the use of a UAV in a terrorist attack.  Terrorism 
presents a security concern, which must be considered across several modes in the air 
transportation system.  While it is a valid regulatory concern, it is beyond the scope of 
this safety analysis. 
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 5.1.2 Likelihood of Occurrence 
The second component of risk shown in Table 7 is the assignment of the 
likelihood of occurrence of an event.  The likelihood of occurrence of an event is 
measured as the average probability that an event will occur per hour of operation of the 
system.  When that likelihood of occurrence is used as a design standard in the system, it 
is also known as the target level of safety (TLS). 
Four categories of likelihood are defined by the FAA, ranging from probable to 
extremely improbable.  Each level of likelihood has a qualitative and quantitative 
definition.  The qualitative definitions from the FAA system safety handbook [47] are 
shown in Table 9.  The quantitative levels vary across FAA advisory material depending 
on the system.   Definitions are consistent between the advisory circular for Part 25 
aircraft [49] and the system safety handbook [47], except for a lack of a hazardous 
category in the former.  Likelihood definitions vary for different types of Part 23 aircraft 
in recognition of different realizable equipment reliability levels [46].  A comparison of 
the likelihood of occurrence definitions across regulatory guidance is shown in Table 10.  
The broad range of the definition of improbable in AC 25.1309 reflects the lack of a 
hazardous classification of consequence.  Part 23 further divides aircraft into four classes 
depending upon propulsion type and weight1.  The most stringent requirements are 
dictated by the system safety handbook. 
Table 9: Qualitative Likelihood of Occurrence Definitions 
Likelihood Definition 
Probable Anticipated to occur one or more times during the entire 
system/operational life of an item. 
Remote Unlikely to occur to each item during its total life. May occur several 
times in the life of an entire system or fleet. 
Extremely 
Remote 
Not anticipated to occur to each item during its total life. May occur a 
few times in the life of an entire system or fleet. 
Extremely 
Improbable 
So unlikely that it is not anticipated to occur during the entire 
operational life of an entire system or fleet. 
 
                                                 
1 Definitions of AC 23.1309 Aircraft Classes [48]: 
I: Typically single reciprocating engine under 6,000 lb 
II: Multiple reciprocating engines or single turbine engine under 6,000 lb 
III: Single reciprocating and turbine engines, multiple reciprocating and turbine engines under 6,000 lb 
IV: Commuter Category 
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 Table 10: Comparison of Likelihood of Occurrence Definitions 
Likelihood of Occurrence (by order of Magnitude) 
Guidance Source 
10-3 10-4 10-5 10-6 10-7 10-8 10-9 below 
FAA SSH Probable Remote Extremely Remote Extremely Improbable 
AC 25.1309 Probable Improbable Extremely Improbable 
IV Probable Remote Extremely Remote Extremely Improbable 
III Probable Remote Extremely Remote Extremely Improbable 
II Probable Remote Extremely Remote Extremely Improbable 
AC 23.1309 
C
la
ss
1 
I Probable Remote Extremely Remote Extremely Improbable 
 
5.2 Empirical Levels of Risk 
In comparison to regulatory guidance, empirical accident data are informative of 
the actual level of risk present in aviation.  The purpose of this section is to investigate 
the rate of occurrence of ground fatalities and midair collisions in the United States to 
illustrate the current level of risk in the system.  In some cases, the level of risk 
experienced differs significantly from the guidelines proposed in system certification. 
5.2.1 Ground Fatalities 
A review of NTSB Accident Data [18] was conducted to determine the current 
number of ground fatalities due to commercial aviation accidents in the United States.  
For scheduled and unscheduled air carrier operations, all accidents resulting in fatalities 
from 1984 to 1999 were reviewed.  Based on the accident narrative, ground fatalities 
from each accident accidents were classified depending on whether the individual was 
involved or uninvolved in the operation of the aircraft.  For example, a ground crew 
member who is fatally injured after being run over by an aircraft would be classified as 
an involved fatality.  Uninvolved personnel were typically members of the general public 
who died when an aircraft collided with their vehicle or residence. 
The number of uninvolved fatalities represents a risk to members of the general 
public who do not receive direct benefit from aviation.  As shown in Figure 16, the 
number of uninvolved fatalities in the general public due to scheduled and unscheduled 
air carrier operations ranges from 0 to 4 annually.  This corresponds to a rate on the order 
of 5 x 10-7 fatalities per hour of operation.  The measure is distinct from the fatality risk 
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 of passengers per flight hour or departure, which is commonly reported.  It demonstrates 
that current aviation operations impose a risk to the general public on the order of 5 
fatalities per hour of operation. 
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Figure 16: Uninvolved Ground Fatalities Due to Air Carrier Accidents 
A similar analysis was performed for general aviation operations.  The data 
source for general aviation aircraft [17] classifies “occupant” and “non-occupant” 
fatalities.  The non-occupant fatalities include fatalities in other aircraft due to midair 
collisions as well as fatalities on the ground.  The data were presented in a form where it 
was not possible to differentiate whether the fatally injured persons were involved or 
uninvolved in the operation of the aircraft.  Therefore, the non-occupant fatality data 
presented below are an upper bound on the number of fatalities in the general public per 
year.  From this data, general aviation accidents result in an average of 15 non-occupant 
fatalities per year, which is on the order of 5 x10-7 fatalities per hour of operation. 
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1 accident  =  
86 Fatalities aboard 
Aeromexico flight, 15 
ground fatalities 
Figure 17: Non-Occupant Fatalities Due to General Aviation Accidents 
Both general aviation and commercial aviation operations exhibit similar levels of 
safety with respect to ground fatalities of 5 x 10-7 fatalities per hour of operation.  This 
rate of occurrence is half an order of magnitude above the most stringent required level of 
safety.  In addition, ground fatality risk has been shown by one statistical study to 
increase by two orders of magnitude in the vicinity of airports [50]1. 
There are other risks to the general public from aerial accidents, apart from the 
actual impact of an aircraft with the ground.  Aircraft also pose a risk to the public on the 
ground through the shedding of “parts” from the aircraft.  There are anecdotal accounts in 
the popular press of “blue ice” falling from aircraft and damaging property [51], although 
in the author’s review, no fatalities have yet occurred.  Space launch activities pose a risk 
through the potential shedding of debris, as well.  The most salient example of which is 
the debris from the space shuttle Columbia accident.  In a casualty expectation analysis of 
all recovered Columbia debris, the expected number of fatalities calculated was 0.11.  
However, the probability that any one person would become a casualty was 7.6 x 10-5 
[52].  The high risk is informative of space agency decisions to de-orbit satellites over the 
ocean. 
                                                 
1 The study measured the annual risk to an individual of becoming a fatality due to an airplane accident as 
1 x 10-6 near the airport, which decreased to 1 x 10-8 4 miles from the airport [50] 
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 5.2.2 Midair Collisions 
The last midair collision to occur between two air carrier aircraft over the United 
States was the collision over the Grand Canyon in 1956 resulting in positive radar 
separation of aircraft in controlled airspace.  Midair collisions occur more frequently in 
general aviation, or between general aviation and air carrier aircraft.  Midair collision 
rates for general aviation from 1991 to 2002 are shown in Figure 18 [37].  The majority 
of general aviation midair collisions usually occur in VFR conditions, at low altitude and 
in the traffic pattern [53].  General aviation has experienced midair collision rates on the 
order of 5 x 10-7, with a recent decline to 2 x 10-7 collisions per hour of operation.  The 
collision rate experienced in the system is two orders of magnitude more frequent than 
the most stringent standards, but exceeds standards for Class I general aviation aircraft.  
The data could not be decomposed further to determine the risk by general aviation 
aircraft class. 
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Figure 18: Midair Collisions in General Aviation 
Users of the NAS also experience collision hazards from other sources.  Bird 
strikes occur frequently and can cause significant damage to aircraft, although regulations 
require most aircraft types to withstand bird strikes from birds weighing 2-8 lb1, and 
notices to airmen are provided when bird risk is high.  Model aircraft, whose operations 
and regulations were discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, also present a collision hazard to 
                                                 
1 Requirements differ between Part 23 and Part 25 aircraft, and with which part of the structure must be 
able to withstand the strike. 
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 manned aircraft.  From a review of the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), there 
were 10 incidents of near mid-air collisions reported with model aircraft in the traffic 
pattern around airports from October 1992 to December 2003. 
5.3 UAV Risk Analysis Approach 
The fundamental approach in risk management is to ensure that hazards in the 
system are controlled or mitigated to an acceptable level of risk in the system.  The goal 
is to ensure that adverse events with more severe consequences will occur less frequently 
in the operation of the system, or be eliminated completely.  The level of risk of a given 
event is described as a combination of the likelihood of occurrence of the event and the 
severity of consequence, as shown previously in Table 7.  The approach to risk analysis 
taken in this report was to estimate the likelihood of occurrence of ground impact and 
midair collisions without mitigation based on several assumptions of vehicle 
characteristics, accident scenarios, and operating characteristics.  Ground impact was 
modeled using event tree analysis and a casualty expectation approach in Chapter 6.  The 
parametric model was applied to vehicles from six different potential categories, and the 
variation of risk with geographic area of operation was also modeled.  Midair collisions 
were modeled based on a gas model of aircraft collisions in Chapter 7.  The model 
assumes the random location of a UAV in airspace.  The variance in midair collision risk 
was investigated across the country and in the vicinity of jet and victor airways. 
Regulatory guidance for the required level of safety of a UAV system is not yet 
defined.  The principle of “first, do no harm” is often cited [54] based on the Hippocratic 
Oath administered to medical doctors.  While this philosophy is attractive in principle, it 
is not explicit in providing the target levels of safety in system design.  In terms of 
ground impact risk, the regulatory guidance and the empirical levels of risk are within an 
order of magnitude for both commercial and general aviation systems.  On the other 
hand, the risk of midair collisions varies greatly depending upon vehicle class.  For 
general aviation, the risk is greater than regulatory guidance for aircraft systems, except 
for the guidance for Class I general aviation aircraft. 
By their nature, it is likely that unmanned aircraft will need to exceed the 
currently demonstrated levels of safety in manned aviation.  In light of the uncertainty 
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 regarding target levels of safety for UAV system design and the difference between 
regulatory guidance and demonstrated levels of safety, an approach was taken in the risk 
analysis of UAV operations to investigate the differential risk posed by varying 
operations and vehicle parameters.  The analysis is informed by the target levels of 
safety, but does not indicate system performance required to gain regulatory approval. 
The quantitative analysis is useful for comparing potential operating strategies, 
reliability requirements, and mitigation possibilities for a broad range of UAV classes.  
The quantitative risk analysis techniques used for the preliminary hazard analysis provide 
an estimate of the average of each risk.  The variability due to unknown parameters was 
not investigated.  The analysis also does not directly include the effect of mitigation 
measures, or requirements due to public risk acceptance.  Both may be critical in the 
regulatory process. 
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 Chapter 6
6 Ground Impact Hazard Analysis 
Ground Impact Hazard Analysis
Ground impact was identified in Chapter 5 as a critical hazard in UAV operations.  
Whenever a UAV overlies a populated area a risk to the general public on the ground will 
be present.  To investigate the influence of several factors of UAV operation on the risk 
of ground fatality, a model of UAV ground impact was created.  The ground impact 
model utilizes event tree analysis and a casualty expectation approach to determine the 
total system reliability required to meet a designated target level of safety.  The variation 
in system reliability required by area of operation and between different potential classes 
of UAVs was investigated. 
6.1 Ground Impact Model 
An event-based model was used to determine a probabilistic expectation of the 
number of fatalities per hour of operation of a UAV system.  The casualty expectation 
approach was originally formulated and has been applied to determine the risk to the 
general public due to space launch activities [52,54].  It was also recently proposed for 
application to UAVs [56] concurrent with a preliminary presentation of the analysis 
conducted in this report [57].  The basis of the approach is in modeling the ground impact 
of a UAV by a sequence of events represented by an event tree, as shown in Figure 19.  
The branches of the tree represent different specific outcomes for the general categories 
shown above each branch, and the outcomes of different paths of the tree are shown to 
the right of the tree.  The bottom line represents the failure path that results in a ground 
fatality. 
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Figure 19: Ground Impact Event Tree 
The event-based model first describes whether a failure of the UAV system has 
occured.  If it has, then an accident has occurred that will result in an uncontrolled ground 
impact.  The model then describes whether a person is located where the UAV impacts, 
and if the debris from the crash penetrates the sheltering in which the person is located.  
Probabilistic expectation of the serial combination of the four events describes the 
expected number of fatalities per hour of operation of the system, and is termed the 
expected level of safety (ELS). 
Failures of the UAV system are modeled to occur at an average rate denoted by 
the mean time between failures, MTBF, indicating the reliability measure of the sytem.  
The expected number of failures per hour is the inverse of the term.  Failures are 
measured as any general type that leads to an accident, including mechanical and 
software failures, human error, and combinations of events that result in a ground impact. 
Ground impact of the UAV “exposes” the general public to potential harm, but 
does not necessarily directly result in a fatality.  By this formulation, the UAV accident 
results in an average area of exposure for which the accident has effects, which can be 
thought of as the lethal debris area.  This area is estimated by the term Aexp.  The 
population who are impacted by the accident are said to be exposed to harm, and the 
expected number of people exposed is the product of the area of exposure and the 
population density of the area, ρ, measured in number of people per square foot.  The 
probabilistic expectation assumes that the population is evenly distributed over the area 
of interest. 
The ground impact model also incorporates population sheltering effects.  This 
aspect of the model recognizes that not all UAV impacts are fatal.  Debris generated by a 
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 UAV accident must penetrate sheltering, such as vehicles, houses, or other buildings in 
which the general public is located, before coming into contact with a person.  The 
proportion of time that the debris will penetrate shelter given exposure is modeled by the 
penetration factor, Ppen.  It is assumed that if debris penetrates sheltering, then a fatality 
has occurred. 
It should be noted that several design factors or operational requirements can 
mitigate the risk of occurrence of a ground fatality.  They can affect any term of the event 
sequence shown in Figure 19, affecting debris size, penetration factor, or vehicle 
reliability.  To capture the effects of mitigation, the term Pmit is included in the 
formulation, indicating the proportion of accidents for which mitigation prevents the 
occurrence of a ground fatality.  With mitigation, the expected level of safety of the 
system is increased by (1 minus Pmit).  For the analysis in this report, mitigation is not 
considered, and the term is set to unity.  The resulting formulation for the expected level 
of safety of a UAV operation with respect to ground impact is given by Equation (1).  
Equation (1) is applied to determine the expected level of safety for several UAV classes 
in Section 6.3. 
 ( )exp Pen mit1ELS= A ρP 1-PMTBF  (1) 
6.2 Model Limitations 
The model described by Equation (1) has several simplifying assumptions which 
impose limitations on its applicability.  The model is based on the event sequence shown 
in Figure 19, therefore other failure modes that may result in ground fatalities, such as the 
loss of a part or collision with bystanders during a controlled landing are not considered.  
The model also does not consider parameter uncertainty, as it only calculates the 
expected rate of occurrence of ground fatalities. 
The model does not account for variability in the population density of the areas 
overflown.  According to FAA guidance, the expected level of safety is calculated as the 
probability of occurrence for an average flight divided by the time of an average flight.  
Therefore, the expected level of safety over several flights would need to take into 
account the average population density overflown if the UAV flies over areas of several 
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 different densities.  The model formulated based on the event sequence of Figure 19 
represents the instantaneous risk of operating over a region of the given density. 
Population sheltering characteristics will vary with the time of day and the day of 
the week, as people participate in different activities such as work, school, or recreation.  
Sheltering characteristics will also vary with location in the United States depending 
upon the type and distribution of structures at that location.  To maintain consistency 
across the United States, the penetration factor was estimated for each vehicle class, and 
temporal and geographic variances were not directly incorporated into the model. 
Due to uncertainties in the model, and these limitations, the results are useful for 
comparisons between vehicle classes and identification of general trends across the 
United States.  To determine the expected level of safety of a specific unmanned system, 
a more detailed model of the UAV’s operations and population sheltering characteristics 
in the vicinity of operation would be required. 
6.3 Model Application 
Although the target level of the safety required by regulations is uncertain, the 
ground impact risk can be communicated as the system reliability required to meet the 
target level of safety.  In this method, the expected level of safety of the system – ELS in 
Equation (1) – is set equal to the target level of safety.  Next, the variation of risk is 
investigated as a function of the mean time between failures, MTBF to meet the required 
target level of safety.  The target level of safety used was 1 x 10-7 fatalities per hour of 
operation, which corresponds to the most stringent FAA guidance on the target level of 
safety for hazardous events.  Using the model in this form allows a more intuitive 
measure of the implications of regulatory requirements on vehicle reliability 
requirements. 
The ground impact model of Equation (1) was applied to six UAVs from the 
Heavy, HALE, MALE, Tactical, Mini, and Micro classifications.  The reliability required 
was calculated parametrically based on representative vehicles for the UAV class.  A 
summary of the parameters of the model are shown in Table 11.  The area of exposure of 
the UAV was estimated as the planform area of the UAV, reflecting the average area of 
lethal debris due to an uncontrolled crash.  The true lethal area may vary depending upon 
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 the nature of the accident and the design and configuration of the aircraft.  Population 
density data were used from the 2000 U.S. Census [58] for tract groups in all 50 United 
States. 
Table 11: UAV Classes for Ground Impact Analysis 
Representative Vehicles Weight Aexp 
Estimated 
PPen 
Heavy 
 
602,500 lb 7700 ft2 100% 
HALE 
 
25,600 lb 900 ft2 90% 
MALE 
 
2,250 lb 360 ft2 60% 
Tactical 
 
351 lb 30 ft2 25% 
Mini 
 
9.6 lb 14 ft2 10% 
Micro 
 
0.14 lb 
(2.16 oz) 0.26 ft
2 5% 
 
The probability of penetration, Ppen, depends on many factors, including the 
energy of the vehicle, the amount of energy several structures can withstand, and the 
distribution of people within those structures.  For this general approach, a single factor 
estimate of the probability of penetration was used.  The probability of penetration shown 
in Table 11 was estimated based on the kinetic energy of the aircraft in cruise, and the 
realization that the factor will vary from 0% to 100% from low to high energy impacts. 
6.4 Results 
The required system reliability to meet an assumed target level of safety of  
10-7 fatalities per hour of operations was calculated based on Equation (1).  The 
ArcMap® software package [58] was used to plot contours of equal reliability required 
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 for the five aircraft in Table 11.  The results of the analysis are shown in Figure 20 
through Figure 25 on the following pages.  Reliability required is divided into five 
divisions in the legend.  Each division spans two orders of magnitude in mean time 
between failures.  The legend symbology and reliability ranges remain constant across 
the figures.  The contours of reliability illustrate both the spatial variation and variation 
between vehicle classes.  Within each figure, differences in reliability required are shown 
corresponding to area of operation, and differences between figures are due to changes in 
the parameters of the vehicle class.  The proportion of the U.S. area for which the 
reliability required is within the given range is also tabulated in the legend.  Figure 26 
summarizes the area of the U.S. at each reliability level for the six UAV classes.   
By area, 6.3% of the United States reported in the census is completely 
unpopulated.  Based on Equation (1), no casualties are expected regardless of how often a 
UAV crashes over this area.  Correspondingly, by this method of communication, zero 
hours are required between failures to operate at any given target level of safety.  This is 
informative of the rationale of testing UAVs and manned military aircraft in some of 
these areas which are essentially deserted.  The areas of zero population density show up 
most apparently as an anomaly in Figure 25 for the Heavy class of UAVs, where there 
are apparently no regions of the country that can be operated at from 1 to 100 hours 
between failures, but 6.3% that can be operated at less than 1 hour between failures.  This 
does not reflect an error in the calculation, but a characteristic of the population density 
data. 
It should be noted that some UAV ground impacts may be categorized as 
catastrophic if they result in a large number of fatalities.  In this case there would be an 
increase in the reliability required beyond the values shown in the figure.  It should also 
be noted that this analysis did not include possible mitigation measures, such as flight 
termination systems, emergency parachute recovery systems, or other measures that 
would lessen the severity of ground impact.  Inclusion of such capabilities in aircraft 
could also be used to achieve an acceptable level of safety. 
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Mean time Area of US 
between failures at Reliability Level 
Less than 1 hr 95.8% 
1 to 100 hr 4.2% 
100 to 10,000 hr 0.0% 
10,000 to 1,000,000 hr 0.0% 
Over 1,000,000 hr 0.0% 
Figure 20: Micro UAV Reliability Required to Meet a Target Level of Safety of 
10-7 fatalities / hr 
Micro 
0.14 
lb
 
 
 
 
Mean time Area of US 
between failures at Reliability Level 
Less than 1 hr 38.0% 
1 to 100 hr 47.5% 
100 to 10,000 hr 4.5% 
10,000 to 1,000,000 hr 0.0% 
Over 1,000,000 hr 0.0% Mini 
9.6 lb 
Figure 21: Mini UAV Reliability Required to Meet a Target Level of Safety of  
10-7 fatalities / hr 
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Mean time Area of US 
between failures at Reliability Level 
Less than 1 hr 17.1% 
1 to 100 hr 62.8% 
100 to 10,000 hr 19.7% 
10,000 to 1,000,000 hr 0.4% 
Over 1,000,000 hr 0.0% 
Figure 22: Tactical UAV Reliability Required to Meet a Target Level of Safety of  
10-7 fatalities / hr 
Tactical 
351 lb 
 
 
 
 
Mean time Area of US 
between failures at Reliability Level 
Less than 1 hr 6.3% 
1 to 100 hr 25.0% 
100 to 10,000 hr 62.3% 
10,000 to 1,000,000 hr 6.3% 
Over 1,000,000 hr 0.0% 
MALE, 2,250 lb 
Figure 23: MALE UAV Reliability Required to Meet a Target Level of Safety of  
10-7 fatalities / hr 
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Mean time Area of US 
between failures at Reliability Level 
Less than 1 hr 6.3% 
1 to 100 hr 10.8% 
100 to 10,000 hr 62.8% 
10,000 to 1,000,000 hr 19.7% 
Over 1,000,000 hr 0.4% 
Figure 24: HALE UAV Reliability Required to Meet a Target Level of Safety of  
10-7 fatalities / hr 
 
 
HALE, 25,600 lb 
Heavy, 
602,500 lb 
 
 
Mean time Area of US 
between failures at Reliability Level 
Less than 1 hr 6.3% 
1 to 100 hr 0.0% 
100 to 10,000 hr 39.6% 
10,000 to 1,000,000 hr 51.2% 
Over 1,000,000 hr 2.9% 
Figure 25: Heavy UAV Reliability Required to Meet a Target Level of Safety of  
10-7 fatalities / hr 
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Figure 26: Proportion of U.S. Area at Required Reliability Level for Different 
Classes of UAVs 
6.5 Conclusions 
The first trend evident with respect to each class of UAV is the significant 
increase in reliability required to operate over metropolitan areas.  One can easily identify 
major cities such as New York, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, and Los Angeles by the two 
order of magnitude increase in the required reliability.  Within UAV classes, the increase 
in risk to the general public is solely due to the increased population density in 
metropolitan areas.  The second trend evident is the increase in required reliability with 
increased vehicle mass.  Comparing between figures shows the increase in reliability 
requirements as vehicle mass increases.  For several classes, the percentage of the 
country that can be operated at different reliability levels is discussed.  This is meant to 
facilitate comparison of the risk variation, not to indicate that operations should be 
restricted bases solely on population density. 
There is a relatively low risk due to the operation of Micro UAVs over the 
majority of the country.  A mean time between accidents on the order of 1 to 100 hours is 
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 required over 4% of the country, which is likely to be a conservative estimate due to the 
high probability of penetration assumed in the analysis.  For mini UAVs, operation over 
95% of the country could be achieved, with a low reliability requirement.  To operate 
over highly populated areas, additional mitigation measures that lessen the impact if an 
accident occurs may need to be employed.  Operation of these types of aircraft is 
potentially allowable with few reliability requirements, even over densely populated 
areas of the country. 
Tactical and MALE UAVs represent an intermediate level of risk.  If the accident 
rates of current unmanned systems can be maintained, then it may be possible to operate 
both classes of vehicles over the majority of the country without additional mitigation.  
Over highly populated areas, increased reliability or additional mitigation would be 
required.  HALE UAVs would need to meet reliability levels of current manned military 
or general aviation aircraft, on the order of 100,000 hr between accidents, to overfly 20% 
of the country. 
The class of Heavy UAVs displays a high reliability required for operation of a 
large portion of the United States.  By its size and character of operation, the Heavy class 
presents a similar risk to the public on the ground as existing commercial aircraft.  
Therefore, to overfly populated areas, it would have to meet the current reliability of 
commercial aircraft, over one million hours between accidents.  The safety of this class of 
UAVs may need to be initially demonstrated over the oceans from coastal airports, 
limiting the general public’s exposure to risk. 
There is a broad variation in reliability required between vehicle classes and area 
of operation.  Therefore, risk mitigation measures and possible operations will vary 
between classes.  In order to be operated over the United States, large mass UAVs will 
need to achieve high reliability with respect to possible ground impact.  For intermediate 
mass UAVs, it may be possible to segregate operations away from high population areas, 
and add additional requirements to achieve operations across the country.  As mass 
further decreases, there is a threshold where it may be possible to operate mini and micro 
UAVs over the majority of the United States with few mitigation measures or reliability 
requirements. 
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 Chapter 7
7 Midair Collision Hazard Analysis 
Midair Collision Hazard Analysis
The second critical hazard of UAV operation identified in Chapter 5 is midair 
collision with another aircraft.  To understand the factors influencing the unmitigated or 
ambient risk of this event, a model of midair collisions between UAVs and other aircraft 
was developed based on the gas model of aircraft collisions.  The model incorporates air 
traffic density data from an FAA surveillance source to determine the expected number 
of collisions per UAV flight hour. 
The model assumes random operation of a UAV without traffic avoidance 
capability.  This type of operation most appropriately describes the operation of small 
UAVs, as discussed in Chapter 3.  For larger aircraft, surveillance is likely to be required 
to prevent collisions.  The safety of operations under positive control would need to be 
captured by separate models of aircraft collisions that consider avoidance capability.  For 
those classes of aircraft, this analysis represents the ambient risk due to random 
operations, with additional safety added by avoidance maneuvers. 
The expected level of safety was investigated in several regions of the NAS, first 
averaged from sea level to 50,000 ft, and then around jet routes and victor airways.  The 
analysis provides insight into the variation of collision risk with respect to structure of the 
NAS and the possibility of low-risk operating strategies. 
7.1 Collision Rate Formulation 
The expected rate of midair collision between a UAV (the “threat” aircraft) and 
other (“threatened”) aircraft was modeled based on a gas model of aircraft collisions [59].  
In this model, the UAV location is assumed to be equally likely in the volume of airspace 
under investigation.  Its velocity is also assumed to be small compared to the threatened 
aircraft.  When threatened aircraft fly through the airspace under investigation, they 
extrude potential collision volumes.  The collision risk, described by the expected number 
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 of collisions per hour of UAV operation is the ratio of volume extruded by threatened 
aircraft per hour to the volume of airspace. 
The midair collision model is illustrated in Figure 27.  Each aircraft flies a 
distance, di through the airspace segment under consideration.  Each threatened aircraft 
also has an area of exposure, Aexp, representing the contact area that is vulnerable to a 
collision.  In this analysis, the area of exposure was estimated as the frontal area of a mid-
sized commercial aircraft (the Boeing 757), approximately 560 ft2.  The area of exposure 
also does not vary significantly with UAV class, assuming the UAV area is small 
compared to the threatened aircraft. 
UAV 
d1
Aexp 
1st Threatened 
Aircraft 
nth Threatened 
Aircraft 
Aexp
dn
Airspace 
Volume 
1st Collision 
Volume 
nth Collision 
Volume 
to 
- 
- 
 
Figure 27: Midair Collision Model 
The area of exposure, extruded over the distance flown represents a potential 
collision volume.  The total collision volume for threatened aircraft is the area of 
exposure times the sum of the distances flown by aircraft in the airspace under 
consideration.  Because an expected collision occurs if the exposure volume overlaps 
with the UAV, the expected number of collisions is equal to the ratio of total collision 
volume to the volume of airspace.  To generate a sufficient sample of the behavior of air 
traffic, the total distance flown within the airspace under consideration is calculated over 
a given period of time, t.  The expected collision rate is equal to the expected number of 
collisions divided by time. 
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 Although a potential collision may occur, there is the possibility that it does not 
result in fatality, either by direct avoidance of the collision, or by mitigating the 
magnitude of the collision.  Recognizing this, an additional mitigation term is included in 
the model, Pfat|coll , which is the conditional probability that the collision is fatal given that 
there was an expected potential collision.  For the baseline analysis, mitigation was not 
included.  Therefore the mitigation term is set equal to unity.  Combining all terms gives 
the expected level of safety in terms of fatal accidents per hour, shown in Equation (2). 
 exp fat|coll
A d
ELS= P
Vt
 (2) 
7.2 Data Source 
In order to investigate air traffic patterns in the NAS, data on all surveilled flights 
over the U.S. for one day in January 2004 were obtained from the FAA Enhanced Traffic 
Management System (ETMS).  The data are organized as position and altitude 
surveillance gathered from both primary and secondary radar returns and represent all 
aircraft tracked by air traffic control.  The data were processed and filtered into usable 
form according to the methodology developed by Mozdzanowska [60]. 
Where radar coverage is not available, especially at low altitude where obscured 
by terrain, flight trajectories are not included in the database or are incomplete.  Some 
vehicles which are not tracked by the system, such as ultralights and some general 
aviation aircraft are not included.  Therefore, the dataset represents an under-sampling of 
traffic density in the NAS.  Additionally, as traffic density is averaged over 24 hours in 
the analysis, the results may also represent an underestimation of the expected level of 
safety at peak times due to temporal variation in traffic. 
7.3 Average Midair Collision Risk over the United States 
To develop a preliminary estimate of midair collision risk, the variation of 
expected level of safety spatially over the United States was investigated, assuming that 
the UAV was equally likely to be located anywhere from sea level to 50,000 ft 
(neglecting the effects of land elevation).  The model of midair collisions given by 
Equation (2) was applied to all air traffic from sea level to 50,000 ft over the United 
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 States.  The resulting variation in expected level of safety over several regions of the 
country is shown in Figure 28.  
The results highlight several spatial trends in traffic density, and proportionally, 
expected level of safety.  First, the majority of the collision risk is concentrated over 
metropolitan areas with major airports.  Second, the structure of the NAS is evident, with 
large traffic density along several well-traveled routes and heavily utilized regions of 
airspace. 
The expected level of safety calculated using this method does not adequately 
represent the behavior of traffic.  The structure of the NAS is such that the majority of 
traffic operates on flight levels and along airways.  This concentrates traffic in local 
regions of increased density in ways that are not directly captured by this method.  
Therefore, in the next section, a methodology is introduced to investigate the variation of 
collision risk with airway structure. 
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Figure 28: Average Expected Level of Safety from 0 to 50,000 ft 
7.4 Airway Structure 
Traffic is not uniformly distributed in the NAS.  Therefore averaging collision 
risk within a cube of airspace did not adequately represent the nature of collision risk.  
The structure of the NAS creates locally high densities of aircraft along airways and on 
flight levels, and a lower density in other regions.  The risk to other air traffic posed by 
UAVs may vary significantly depending upon the type of operations allowed for UAVs.  
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 For example, it may be possible to significantly reduce the ambient risk of UAV 
operation by requiring the UAV to be operated away from airways and major flight 
levels. 
7.4.1 Regions Investigated 
To determine the amount of variation in the expected level of safety of UAV 
operations with respect to airspace structure, traffic density was investigated in the 
vicinity of jet routes and victor airways in the United States.  Conceptual areas of traffic 
density and behavior in the vicinity of airways were identified and are shown in  
Figure 29.  The four areas of operation for each type of airway form a matrix, described 
by either being on or off a major flight level (in the altitude dimension), or on or off the 
airway (in the cross-track dimension). 
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Figure 29: Conceptual Areas of Operation in the Vicinity of Airways 
The width of a victor airway is defined by the FAA as 4 nm from centerline to 
boundary [29].  Jet routes do not have a defined width, but 4 nm was used to remain 
consistent between analyses.  Victor airways and jet routes are defined between 
navigational aides, with intersections and intermediate points designated by reporting 
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 fixes.  Traffic density was analyzed within 20 nm on either side of the airway centerline, 
and results will be shown within 15 miles of the centerline to remove boundary effects.  
Expected level of safety beyond 20 nm from the airway centerline was not investigated 
due to computational processing limitations. 
Traffic density, and therefore collision risk, is expected to be highest on major 
flight levels and within the airway boundaries, reflecting the operation of the majority of 
aircraft navigating along airways at a constant altitude.  Traffic density is expected to be 
lowest both off flight levels and away from airway boundaries.  Traffic in this region is 
expected to be in transition between flight levels and navigational fixes (in two 
dimensions).  The remaining two regions, where transition is expected in only one 
dimension, should have densities somewhere in between the other regions. 
7.4.2 Data Transformation 
To adequately capture behavior within the regions shown in Figure 29, flights 
from the ETMS data source were transformed from latitude, longitude, and altitude into 
local airway coordinates for each airway in the vicinity of the flight path.  The local 
airways coordinates are measured by cross-track deviation from the airway centerline, 
altitude, and length along the airway.  A three-dimensional interpolation was then 
performed to determine the length traveled by the flight along the airway in bins 
measuring 0.25 nm in width and 100 ft in altitude.  Distance flown was aggregated for all 
aircraft by airway and bin size.  The result for each airway was a measure of the average 
density of traffic in each bin.  The midair collision model was then applied and the 
expected level of safety was averaged along the length of all airways jet routes and a 
subset of victor airways in the NAS. 
7.5 Midair Collision Risk in the Vicinity Airways 
7.5.1 Jet Routes 
To investigate the variation of collision risk around jet routes, air traffic density 
was aggregated over all jet routes in the United States, using the method described in the 
previous section.  This included 263 routes, totaling 184,000 nm in length.  The expected 
level of safety in terms of collisions per hour was calculated using the midair collision 
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 model of Equation (2).  The variation in expected level of safety in the vicinity of airways 
is shown in several dimensions in Figure 30.  To discuss general trends in risk around 
airways for a range of UAV operations, the expected level of safety was averaged over 
the length of all jet routes.  Density may vary locally along individual airways due to the 
behavior of traffic in the area. 
Figure 30a shows the contours of expected level of safety with respect to both 
cross-track deviation and altitude.  The regions around the airway identified in Figure 29 
are evident in the contour plot.  Each dimension is further analyzed in Figure 30b to 
Figure 30d.  High collision risk is washed out in Figure 30a, denoted by the largest and 
darkest bin representing an expected level of safety at and above 1 x 10-6 collisions / hr.  
For the baseline case without mitigation, there are few regions in the vicinity of airways 
with an expected level of safety below the FAA’s most stringent target level of safety of 
10-9 collisions per hour. 
To examine the variation of collision risk with altitude while operating within 
airway boundaries, the average collision risk within 4 nm of the airway centerline along 
flight levels is shown in parts b and c of Figure 30.  Jet routes show a clear stratification 
of density, and therefore expected level of safety along major flight levels.  The 1,000 ft 
separation between flight levels from FL 180 to FL 290 and 2,000 ft separation from FL 
290 to FL 4501 are apparent in both parts b and c of Figure 30.  The highest average 
expected level of safety on an airway is at FL 370, and is approximately 4 x 10-5 
collisions / hr.  The lowest expected level of safety is on the order of 10-9 above FL 430. 
Parts d and e of Figure 30 show the variation of collision risk with distance from 
the airway for several altitudes on and off major airways respectively.  There is a 
consistent pattern for all altitudes under investigation, with a large increase in the 
expected level of safety within approximately 2 nm of the airway centerline, and a 
constant expected level of safety outside of the airway boundaries.  Expected level of 
safety is on the order of 2 x 10-7 collisions / hr, off airways and off major flight levels. 
There is a two order of magnitude difference between regions on major flight 
levels and airways, and off flight levels away from the airway.  The overall collision risk 
                                                 
1 Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM) had not been enacted at the time the data were collected.  
On January 20, 2005, the separation between flight levels from FL 290 to FL 410 was reduced to 1,000 ft. 
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 estimates do not meet the FAA’s most stringent target level of safety, but operations off 
major airways could potentially be conducted with additional avoidance capability below 
the currently demonstrated level of safety with respect to midair collisions.  Additionally, 
operations above FL 430 present a very low midair collision risk. 
It should be noted that the estimated expected level of safety does not reflect any 
avoidance maneuvers undertaken by the aircraft, and therefore represents the ambient risk 
due to air traffic.  Additional risk mitigation measures and positive separation of aircraft 
further reduce collision risk. 
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Figure 30: Average Expected Level of Safety in the Vicinity of all Jet Routes in the 
United States 
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 7.5.2 Victor Airways 
To adequately capture the behavior of air traffic around victor airways, it was 
necessary to select an area of the country with sufficient radar coverage at low altitude.  It 
was also desirable to find a region with a high density of air traffic.  Under these criteria, 
flight traffic in the vicinity of victor airways within the Northeast (NE) Corridor of the 
United States was analyzed, extending from south of Washington, DC to north of Boston, 
MA.  This region included portions of 102 separate airways, totaling 13,000 nm in length.  
To maintain general applicability to a wide range of UAV operations, the expected level 
of safety was averaged over the length of all victor airways in the northeast. 
The average expected level of safety was calculated based on the midair collision 
model of Equation (2).  The variation in expected level of safety in the vicinity of airways 
is shown in several dimensions in Figure 31 averaged over all victor airways in the NE 
corridor.  Density may vary locally along individual airways due to the behavior of traffic 
in the area and may be lower in other regions of the country where there is a lower 
density of aircraft.  The expected level of safety over victor airways exhibits similar 
stratification to jet routes in both dimensions, as shown in Parts a & b of Figure 31. 
Figure 31c shows the variation of expected level of safety with altitude, averaged 
within 4 nm of the airway centerline.  Unlike traffic around jet routes, the expected level 
of safety does not vary significantly with altitude at the lower boundaries of airspace, 
below 5,000 ft.  This trend is likely due to the behavior of traffic in the vicinity of airports 
in the region.  The majority of traffic at low altitudes is likely to be maneuvering 
significantly during departure and arrival, and may not be operating along airways for 
VOR approaches in the traffic pattern.  High density likely extends to ground level, but 
the traffic dataset is under-sampled in this region due to terrain blockage of radar returns.  
Above 5,000 ft in altitude, 1,000 ft separation between flight levels is again apparent, and 
maximum collision risk is on the order of 7 x 10-6 collisions / hr at 18,000 ft. 
Figures 9d and 9e show the variation of the expected level of safety with distance 
from the airway for sample altitudes on and off major airways respectively.  Again, the 
results are dissimilar to jet routes at low altitude, with little variation in risk with distance 
from airway centerline.  As altitude increases, there is an increase in collision risk within 
approximately 2 nm of the airway centerline.  The expected level of safety off airway and 
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 off major flight levels is on the order of 3 x 10-7 collisions / hr, at both 6,200 ft and 
13,300 ft.  This is of similar magnitude to the ambient risk off major altitudes and off 
airway for jet routes. 
Again similar to the expected level of safety in the vicinity of jet routes, there is a 
difference of two orders of magnitude between regions on major flight levels and on 
airways, and off flight level away from the airway.  The overall collision risk estimates 
do not meet the FAA’s most stringent target level of safety.  However, it should be noted 
that the risk estimated for victor airways do not reflect any avoidance maneuvers 
undertaken by the aircraft.  In areas where the ambient risk is high, methods for avoiding 
collisions with other aircraft are likely to be required to meet an acceptable level of 
safety. 
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Figure 31: Average Expected Level of Safety in the Vicinity of Victor Airways in the 
NE Corridor 
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 7.6 Conclusions 
Under the assumptions of this analysis, the expected level of safety for 
unmitigated UAV operations in the airspace follow similar trends in the vicinity of jet 
routes and victor airways.  There is a difference of two orders of magnitude between 
operations on major flight levels and on airways and off major flight levels and off 
airways.  The expected level of safety on the former is on the order of 10-5 collisions / hr 
and on the latter, 10-7 collisions / hr.  Below 5,000 ft, there are not a significant variation 
in traffic density, and therefore collision risk between major flight levels. 
The trends in collision risk indicate that positive separation measures are likely to 
be required for all UAVs that operate within the boundaries of airways and on the same 
flight levels as current traffic at both high and low altitudes.  This may either be provided 
by air traffic control or by a form of active collision avoidance by the UAV system.  For 
an initial operating strategy, it is possible to operate UAVs between flight levels where 
the ambient traffic densities are low, with limited forms of collision avoidance mitigation.  
This mitigation may be in the form of segregation by air traffic control, or a lesser 
capability of the UAV system to avoid other traffic.  This strategy does not generally 
appear to be feasible below 5,000 ft, or in local areas where there is a significant amount 
of air traffic in transition.  At lower altitudes, local ground radar or line of sight collision 
prevention may be useful mitigation measures for preventing midair collisions. 
Operations away from airways and away from major flight levels have the lowest 
risk.  Without mitigation, the ambient collision risk is on the order of 10-7, which is the 
currently experienced rate of midair collisions in general aviation aircraft.  Based on the 
model, there is the opportunity to operate small UAVs without collision avoidance 
systems in these regions but with other potential mitigation measures. 
Another low risk area of operation exists above the majority of commercial air 
traffic.  High altitude, long endurance aircraft could be introduced above FL 500 in the 
region of uncontrolled airspace.  Sufficient safety procedures would need to be crafted for 
the ascent and descent of the UAV, but onboard collision avoidance capability may not 
be required within the system. 
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 Chapter 8
8 Ground Impact and Midair Collision Risk Mitigation 
Ground Impact and Midair Collision 
Risk Mitigation
8.1 Need for Mitigation 
The risk analyses performed for ground impact in Chapter 6 and midair collisions 
in Chapter 7 described the effect of several factors in vehicle design and operation that 
influence the ambient risk posed by UAV operations in the NAS.  The analysis did not 
include the effect of mitigation measures, or measures that are further utilized in a system 
to reduce risk.  The results of the risk analysis highlight the necessity of mitigation 
measures that reduce both the risk of ground impact and midair collision.  When 
mitigation is required, there are a range of potential measures that can be implemented 
depending upon vehicle class, type of operation, and the level of safety required. 
8.2 Risk Mitigation Strategies 
There are several mitigation strategies that can be employed to further reduce risk 
both to the general public on the ground and to the traveling public in other aircraft.  
Mitigation measures were previously discussed in Chapter 4 in the context of current 
rules and regulations governing unmanned kites, balloons, and rockets, and model 
aircraft.  In this section, some potential strategies for mitigating ground impact and 
midair collision risk are introduced and discussed. 
8.2.1 Possible Mitigation Measures of Ground Impact Risk 
A) Reduce the exposure to risk of the public on the ground 
UAVs expose the general public to potential harm whenever they are flown over a 
populated area.  Therefore, one mitigation measure is to limit the operations of the UAV 
to reduce exposure of the public on the ground to risk.  This measure ensures that any 
potential failure will be less likely to result in a ground fatality because it is less likely 
that the UAV will impact a person.  There are several potential approaches to accomplish 
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 this mitigation strategy.  The approaches vary in how they limit the operation of the 
UAV. 
One potential approach is to limit the operation of UAVs to sparsely populated 
areas, or away from major population centers, depending upon a threshold population 
density.  This is currently utilized for experimental test flights of military aircraft and 
some UAV operations by limiting to restricted airspace or unpopulated test ranges.  A 
degree of population protection could also be accomplished by limiting operations near 
airports, as airports are generally located near population centers.  This measure protects 
the public from harm, but also restricts UAVs from operations where they may be most 
useful. 
A second approach is to ensure local control over the exposure of risk to persons 
on the ground.  If it is desired to operate over an urban area while also reducing 
population exposure, there is a possibility to utilize a highly precise navigation system 
that limits the operation of the aircraft to designated areas of low risk.  The UAV could 
be operated in such a way to ensure that it is always over locally sparse population areas 
or areas where people are sheltered from harm.  For example, the UAV’s flight path 
could be limited to operation over waterways, undeveloped land, or above buildings with 
sufficient sheltering to protect the building occupants from harm. 
B) Ensure UAV System Reliability 
The two primary causes attributed to a significant portion of current UAV 
accidents are electromechanical failure and human error [61].  Reducing the rate of 
component or system failures reduces the potential for an accident.  Mitigation strategies 
in this area ensure greater system reliability.  Improving training and facilitating 
operation can also reduce the amount of human errors that result in system failures.  The 
increased utilization of software in UAV systems will require several measures to ensure 
that the software contributes to system reliability. 
C) Facilitate Safe Recovery from Failures 
Methods can also be utilized to ensure recovery from mechanical or system 
failures, should they occur.  By recovering from failures, operation of the system can 
continue with safety margins reduced, or a sufficient level of control can still be 
exercised to further mitigate the effects of the failure.  Implementing recovery mitigation 
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 requires both the ability to detect failures and to take corrective action.  The mitigation be 
implemented at several points in the system.  Recovery methods can influence the effects 
of impact by diverting from populated areas if a failure occurs, or initiating additional 
mitigation systems that reduce the effects of UAV ground impact.  
D.) Reduce the effects of UAV ground impact. 
Several factors influence the severity of the UAV ground impact, including UAV 
mass, size, speed at ground impact, and stored fuel energy.  Each parameter has a 
corresponding lever for reducing the severity of harm created if the vehicle impacts the 
ground.  Limits on UAV size, mass distribution, fuel load, or cruise speed set thresholds 
on momentum or energy of impact, and therefore act to mitigate the effects of UAV 
ground impact.  Active measures also can reduce the severity of ground impact.  Ballistic 
recovery systems could be used to slow the descent of the vehicle, if an uncontrollable 
failure occurs and flight termination systems offer the possibility of detonating parts of 
the vehicle while still in the air to reduce the size, energy, and therefore potential for 
harm of debris. 
There are several factors that must be considered regarding active mitigation 
measures.  They require a control ability to detect and activate in the event of a potential 
vehicle loss, and could initiate an accident by unintended activation.  They must also 
reduce the energy of impact sufficiently to reduce the severity of the accident’s effects.  
Therefore, they may not be appropriate for larger UAVs that can not be slowed to 
sufficient speed, or would cause more damage with dispersed debris.  Finally, measures 
such as a flight termination system effectively destroy the aircraft, which results in a 
complete financial and functional loss of the system. 
8.2.2 Possible Mitigation Measures of Midair Collision Risk 
A.) Reduce the exposure of risk to other aircraft 
As demonstrated in the analysis of Chapter 7, midair collision risk is proportional 
to traffic density in the area of operation.  Although the model did not account for 
directional effects of traffic flows, they also have an influence on the risk of collision 
[59].  There are several mitigation measures that can be utilized to reduce the ambient 
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 risk of collisions with other aircraft.  Similar to ground impact, the measures vary in the 
degree of separation of UAV traffic from other aircraft. 
One strategy is to completely separate UAV operations from other aircraft.  This 
is currently utilized by limiting some military or research operations to restricted 
airspace.  It can also be applied in a more limited form, such as segregating UAV 
operations to a designated flight level and restricting other operations in the area.  A final 
possibility for separating UAV operations is to conduct them below the height of 
buildings or structures in the area.  For small UAVs, this is a viable strategy to reduce the 
risk of collision with manned aircraft, as obstructions to navigation are already marked on 
sectionals and physically visible and most manned aircraft are prohibited from operating 
within a fixed distance of structures on the ground. 
Operational strategies can reduce the ambient risk of operations, while still 
integrating UAV operations in the NAS.  As shown in Chapter 7, collision risk is greatly 
reduced when operating off airways and off major flight levels.  To reduce ambient risk, 
UAVs could be precluded from operating within airway boundaries, and be required to 
perform the majority of their mission between major flight levels.  Restrictions on 
airspace and airport operations could also restrict UAVs from operating in airspace 
classes with increased density. 
B.) Reduce the Frequency of Initiating Failures 
In the context of midair collision prevention, initiating failures are defined as 
system or component failures that result in the loss of separation between aircraft.  
Therefore, mitigation measures in this category assure procedural separation of traffic.  
That separation fails if aircraft are set on a collision course.  Aircraft separation is assured 
either through procedural or active separation of traffic.  Specific implementations of this 
category of mitigation might be operational or right of way rules or positive separation 
through air traffic control. 
C.) Facilitate Recovery from Failures 
Mitigation measures that facilitate recovery from failures prevent collisions if a 
loss of separation occurs.  Facilitating recovery from a potential collision requires 
awareness of other traffic and control authority for collision prevention.  As a collision is 
the result of the interaction of two or more aircraft, mitigation can be applied to facilitate 
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 avoidance by either aircraft.  On the UAV, collision avoidance can be achieved through 
active surveillance and maneuvering to avoid other traffic by capabilities onboard the 
vehicle or through an external operator.  Mitigation measures can also facilitate the 
avoidance of other aircraft from the UAV.  By this strategy, the UAV must be made 
visible to other air traffic visually, through air traffic control, or by broadcast. 
D.) Reduce the severity of UAV mid-air impact 
Similar to reducing the energy of ground impact, the risk UAVs pose with respect 
to midair collisions could also be mitigated by reducing the severity of the impact.  The 
same vehicle design characteristics such as mass, size, and density that influence the 
magnitude of harm for ground impact also relate to the severity of midair collisions.  
Additionally, the frangibility, or ease of fracture, of the vehicle influences impact loads.  
Limiting the UAV characteristics that influence impact loads to certain thresholds could 
prevent the loss of another aircraft if a collision occurs. 
There is a precedent to setting regulatory standards on object impact to not impart 
substantial damage to aircraft components.  Several components of manned aircraft 
certified under Part 23 and Part 25 are required to continue to function after collision with 
a bird ranging in weight from 2 to 8 lbs.  Additionally, varying limits are placed on 
construction, mass, and size of kites, balloons, and rockets operated under Part 101. 
8.3 Framework for Evaluation of Mitigation 
There is a need to evaluate the effectiveness of mitigation measures at reducing or 
controlling risk.  One potential approach to incorporating mitigation measures into the 
risk analysis is to use an event-based framework similar to the one utilized in Chapter 6 
for ground impact.  This notional framework is shown below in Figure 32.  The 
framework describes events in an accident sequence and can be applied to a variety of 
hazards, including ground impact and midair collision depending upon the initial 
exposure to harm.  The event sequence progresses from initial exposure to harm, through 
a system failure, to adverse effects to the general public.  Each node in the tree branches 
on the potential occurrence of further events in the event sequence, until a final outcome, 
classified by level of harm, is reached.  It should be noted that it was beyond the scope of 
this report to evaluate the effectiveness of specific mitigation measures by this approach. 
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Figure 32: Event Tree-Based Approach to Evaluating Effectiveness of Mitigation 
Mitigation measures are separated in the framework by the place in the event 
sequence in which they have effects, labeled as nodes A through D.  The tree terminates 
in a series of outcomes, shown on the right side of Figure 32.  An event node can also be 
expanded into additional sequences of events to capture the physical dynamics of a 
specific event sequence.  Several example mitigation measures and environmental factors 
that influence the occurrence of events are shown at the bottom of Figure 32.  Some 
mitigation measures have effects at several points in the event sequence.  An example is 
mass and size limitations, which influence both the likelihood of exposure to harm and 
the effects of a failure 
Each branch of the tree has an associated probability of occurrence conditional on 
the previous events in the sequence.  Coupled with environmental factors, the influence 
of mitigation measures is modeled by the effect on the conditional probability of each 
branch.  The effects are aggregated through each path in the tree to determine the overall 
probability of a given outcome, indicated by the total probabilities on the right hand side 
of Figure 32.  In parallel with the evaluation of their effectiveness, the cost, technical 
feasibility, and policy considerations associated with the implementation of mitigation 
measures must also be investigated. 
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 One of the limitations of the risk-based analysis is that it does not directly 
incorporate an analysis of public risk perception.  Consideration of the perception of the 
general public and other operators in the NAS is an important piece of public policy.  
Research has shown that the public tends to perceive risk based on the benefit they 
achieve from technology and their opinion of the technology in addition to the 
quantitative level of risk [62].  Thus, controlling the quantitative level of risk must be 
considered along with additional mitigation and communication strategies that may be 
required based on public perception. 
8.4 Conclusions 
There is a wide range of mitigation measures that can be utilized to reduce the 
risk of UAV operations in the NAS.  The optimal solution for integrating UAV 
operations into the existing system should utilize the appropriate measures to ensure 
public safety while maintaining the ability to achieve benefits from UAV operations.  An 
understanding of the cost, feasibility, and effectiveness of the mitigation measures is 
required so UAV policymakers can incorporate the most effective mitigation measures 
into the system at the least possible cost. 
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 Chapter 9 
9 Conclusions 
Conclusions
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are emerging as new entrants in the National Airspace 
System.  UAVs can provide a potential public benefit for several applications, yet 
integration of UAVs into the National Airspace System will be a challenging task.  There 
is a broad range of potential UAV operations, varying by size, performance, and 
architecture.  There is also a broad range of potential policy options for ensuring safe 
integration. 
The FAA has authority over the operation of UAVs and a mandate to ensure 
public safety in aviation.  An approach was taken in this report to analyze the various 
factors that will influence the safe operations of UAVs in the NAS, as well as the 
regulatory bases and mechanisms for safe operation.  A risk analysis for ground impact 
and midair collision was performed according to FAA system safety standards to 
compare risk posed by different types of UAV operations and to investigate the influence 
of vehicle characteristics on risk.  Operational and performance characteristics were also 
examined to determine the safety implications along broad ranges of UAVs. 
Military operations have proven the operational concept for UAVs, and provided 
the impetus behind current efforts in integrating UAVs in the NAS to facilitate 
operational relocation.  Use in civil operations continues to be driven by vital and 
specialized applications, such as border patrol by the Department of Homeland Security 
[63].  Several projections indicate that UAVs will be substantial users of the future NAS 
[2], although the character and type of operations is still uncertain [64]. The routine 
operation of UAVs will depend upon rules and regulations formed regarding their design, 
manufacture, and operation 
UAV operations can be defined both by the control architecture of the system and 
by the performance characteristics of different classes.  In discussing safety implications, 
a classification primarily based on mass was adopted.  UAVs were classified as Micro, 
Mini, Tactical, Medium Altitude, High Altitude, or Heavy.  The classifications facilitate 
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 discussion of the broad range of UAV types and the variation of risk presented to the 
public. 
Preserving the safety of the public is a fundamental requirement in integrating 
UAVs in the NAS, and is the primary mandate given to the FAA.  The FAA has ensured 
the safety of the current air transportation system through regulation, operational 
procedures, and technological improvements, but did not anticipate the broad range of 
emerging UAVs.  Current regulations governing unmanned aircraft are limited in scope 
to balloons, kites, and rockets, and model aircraft.  Any UAVs not operated under these 
rules must be approved by exception granted a Certificate of Authorization to operate in 
the NAS.  The COA application requires lengthy review by FAA officials, and can be 
inefficient and cumbersome. 
To determine the implication of safe integration of UAVs in the NAS, a risk 
analysis of the critical hazards of midair collision and ground impact was performed 
according to FAA system safety guidelines.  A model of the expected level of safety in 
terms of ground fatalities and potential collisions was developed based on a model of the 
physical event sequence resulting in the two hazardous events.  The model determined 
the relationship between operational and vehicle parameters on the risk of ground 
fatalities and midair collisions.  The model did not include potential mitigation or traffic 
avoidance measures. 
The results of the risk analysis show several opportunities for integrating UAVs in 
the NAS with varying degrees of restrictions.  Small UAVs in the Micro and Mini 
categories can be operated at a relatively low risk to the general public on the ground 
without significant reliability requirements or mitigation.  The risk of midair collisions 
will have to be mitigated or controlled if it is desired to integrate these classes of UAVs 
with other traffic in the NAS.  Although it was not investigated in this report, collision 
risk may be significantly lower when UAVs of these classes are operated near ground 
level.  Therefore small UAVs may be able to operate in this region without significant 
collision mitigation. 
As the mass of UAVs increases, the risk to the general public also increases 
significantly.  For UAVs in the Tactical, Medium Altitude, and High Altitude classes, 
additional mitigation will likely be required to protect the general public from harm.  
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 Reliability requirements or operating restrictions may need to be placed on the system to 
ensure that the risk to the general public on the ground is controlled.  UAVs in the Heavy 
class will require safety levels currently achieved by commercial aircraft to ensure the 
safety of the general public on the ground.  A potential initial operating strategy for this 
class is introduction into service in oceanic cargo flights, thus limiting exposure of risk to 
the general public. 
Mitigation of midair collision risk is likely to be required for all UAVs that cannot 
be separated from other air traffic through operational restrictions.  The average traffic 
density in the vicinity of victor airways and jet routes in the NAS is sufficiently high to 
pose a significant collision risk for all UAV classes without mitigation, under the 
assumptions of the analysis in this report.  There are a variety of mitigation measures that 
can be applied and could vary by UAV mass or type of operation.  The ambient risk can 
be reduced by operating away from regions of high density, as risk was shown to vary by 
two orders of magnitude between operation on airways and on major flight levels and off 
major flight and outside of airway boundaries.  Therefore, the type of operation of the 
aircraft will significantly impact the risk. 
There is a need to evaluate the impact of mitigation measures on the level of risk 
posed to the general public and other aircraft in UAV operations.  While it was beyond 
the scope of this report to evaluate specific mitigation measures, an event-based 
framework was introduced that could be utilized to evaluate the effectiveness of risk 
mitigation measures.  The event-based framework can be used to model mitigation 
measures and environmental characteristics depending upon where the parameters have 
effect in the event sequence.  Consideration of additional factors such as cost and 
technological feasibility along with mitigation effectiveness can inform a future risk 
management approach to achieving routine UAV operations in the NAS.  The optimal 
approach will ensure safety through the most effective measures while still enabling 
public benefit for a variety of operations. 
There is a clear demand for the ability to operate UAVs in the NAS, and broad 
effort to create regulations governing their design, manufacture, and operation.  This 
report has systematically examined key UAV operational characteristics relevant to 
safety, and analytically evaluated two critical risks of ground fatalities and midair 
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 collisions.  Where analysis indicates that risk levels are unacceptable, a basic framework 
has been presented to formally evaluate the effectiveness of mitigation measures.  The 
combined analysis presented in this report facilitates a thorough understanding of safety 
considerations for operation of UAVs in the NAS and provides an analytical basis for 
future regulatory decisions. 
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 Appendix A 
 
UAV Performance Capabilities 
 
Table A1: UAV Performance Capabilities 
Vehicle/ Class Payload Weight
Max TO 
Weight
Max 
Speed
Loiter 
Speed
Max Climb 
Rate Ceiling Endurance
(lb) (lb) (kt) (kt) (ft/min) (ft) (hr)
Aerovironment Black Widow Black Widow 0.016 0.133 39 23 800 0.37
Aerovironment Wasp Wasp 0.4 1000 1.78
BAE Systems Microstar Microstar 0.033 0.188 80 0 0.33
Aerovironment Pointer Pointer 2 9.6 43 16 300 1000 1.5
Aerovironment/NRL Dragon Eye Dragon Eye 0.5 5.8 35 1000 0.8
Alcore Azimut Azimut 4.4 19.8 65 16 985 2.5
EMT Aladin Aladin 6.6 48 0 0.5
Insitu Seascan/ Scaneagle Seascan 7.1 33 68 49 492 16000 15
NRL Extender Extender 7 31 73 39 0 2.3
NRL Sender Sender 2.5 10 90 50 5000 2
AAI Shadow 200 (RQ-7A) Shadow 200 55.7 328 123 53 1500 15000 6
AAI/IAI Pioneer (RQ-2A) Pioneer 100 419 100 80 807 15000 6.5
BAE Systems Phoenix Phoenix 110.2 397 85 70 8000 4.5
BTA Mini Sheddon Sheddon 59.5 70 30 12000 2.5
BTA Sheddon Mk 3 Shed Mk3 88.2 70 40 15000 6
EADS SDE Fox AT Fox 33.1 198.4 97 39 10000 3
EMT Luna Luna 6.6 66.1 86 26 984 9840 4
General Atomics Prowler II ProwlerII 100 700 125 50 1500 21000 20
IAI Searcher Searcher 139 820 105 60 15000 14
Northrop Grumman/IAI Hunter (RQ-5A) Hunter 250 1600 110 60 761 15000 12
Silver Arrow Mini-V Mini-V 18 110 110 50 1100 15000 5
EADS SDE Eagle 1 Eagle 1 551 2535 125 25000 30
EADS SDE Eagle 2 Eagle 2 992 7936 240 45000 24
General Atomics Gnat I-Gnat/Rotax 914 Gnat 2 450 1550 160 1300 30000 40
General Atomics Predator (MQ-1) Predator 450 2250 117 73 25000 40
General Atomics Predator B (MQ-9B) Predator B 3800 10000 225 70 2400 52000 32
IAI Heron Heron 551 2425 125 80 650 30000 50
Silver Arrow Hermes 1500 Hermes 1500 661 3637 130 80 902 33000 26
Aerovironment Centurion Centurion 600 1400 21 60000 15
Aerovironment Pathfinder Plus Pathfinder+ 700 20 80200
Aurora Flight Sciences Perseus Perseus 331 2205 69 65000 27
General Atomics Altus II Altus II 330 2150 100 65 65000 24
NASA/SCI Raptor Demonstrator 2 Raptor 75 1880 80 5573 65000 48
Northrop Grumman Global Hawk Global Hawk 2000 25600 395 343 65000 42
Chart Legend
Micro
Tactical
Mini
High Altitude
Medium Altitude
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